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Content
January 1981, Volume 36, Issue 1
- 3-16 Some advantages of social control: An individualist defense
by Lester Hunt - 17-32 Utility-maximizing behavior in organized anarchies: An empirical investigation of the Breneman thesis
by Fred Thompson - 33-41 The Minister's memos: The re-election issue
by Gareth Locksley - 43-52 An analysis of factors affecting differential assessment legislation
by Rod Ziemer & Fred White & Ivery Clifton - 53-62 The expenditure effects of municipal annexation
by Stephen Mehay - 63-73 The economics of choice in the allocation of Federal grants: An empirical test
by John Gist & R. Hill - 75-87 Pareto optimality as a guide to income redistribution
by E. Pasour - 89-114 Approval voting, Condorcet's principle, and runoff elections
by Peter Fishburn & Steven Brams - 115-134 Strategic decisions under one-stage multi-candidate voting systems
by Samuel Merrill - 135-140 Voting as an act of contribution
by Melvin Hinich - 141-146 The inherent disadvantage of the presidential party in midterm congressional elections
by Randall Calvert & R. Isaac - 147-151 Rank-dominance in income distributions
by Rubin Saposnik - 153-158 A further characterization of Borda ranking method
by Shmuel Nitzan & Ariel Rubinstein - 159-164 Optimally allocating campaign expenditures
by Stuart Nagel - 165-169 Political participation under the unit rule: A research note
by William Collins - 171-177 Politics as a filter
by George Daly - 179-186 The Buchanan-Tullock model: Some extensions
by Milton Kafoglis & Richard Cebula - 187-192 The incentives of regulators: Evidence from banking
by Robert Michaels & Lionel Kalish - 193-194 An approach to empirical measures of voting paradoxes
by John Dobra & Gordon Tullock - 195-196 Mr. Friedman's strictures on Murder at the Margin
by Marshall Jevons - 197-208 Reviews
by Robert Tollison & James Buchanan & Barry Baysinger & Richard Carter & Gordon Tullock
January 1980, Volume 35, Issue 5
- 513-527 Agriculture in development: A coalitional analysis
by Robert Bates & William Rogerson - 529-547 Bureaucratic productivity: The case of agricultural research
by Vernon Ruttan - 549-564 The impact of rational participation models on voting attitudes
by Gregory Brunk - 565-574 The probability-choice perspective in voter decision making models
by Jerome Black - 575-585 Voter turnout and the benefits of voting
by John Filer & Lawrence Kenny - 587-606 A general theory of interpersonal exchange
by Jon Cauley & Todd Sandler - 607-622 Optimal fiscal illusion and the size of government
by E. West & Stanley Winer - 623-631 The influence of state-level economic conditions on presidential elections
by Burton Abrams - 633-635 Reviews
by Israel Kirzner & Gordon Tullock
January 1980, Volume 35, Issue 4
- 385-402 Ambiguity in spatial models of policy formation
by Richard McKelvey - 403-419 Social homogeneity and Condorcet's paradox
by Peter Fishburn & William Gehrlein - 421-436 Preference expression and misrepresentation in points voting schemes
by Shmuel Nitzan & Jacob Paroush & Shlomo Lampert - 437-455 On strategy-proofness and single peakedness
by H. Moulin - 457-468 Running off empty: Run-off point systems
by Jeffrey Richelson - 469-481 Liberal paradox, game equilibrium, and Gibbard optimum
by Friedrich Breyer & Roy Gardner - 483-491 The comparative likelihood of an equivocal outcome under the plurality, Condorcet, and Borda voting procedures
by Raphael Gillett - 493-501 The provision of a public good under Cournot behavior: Stability conditions
by Ralph Frasca - 503-509 Strongly nonmanipulable multi-valued collective choice rules
by Allan Feldman - 511-512 Review
by James Bennett
January 1980, Volume 35, Issue 3
- 257-266 Some tests of the factor-supplier pressure group hypothesis
by F. Cummings & Wayne Ruhter - 267-275 The effect of tax elasticity on government spending
by Eleanor Craig & A. Heins - 277-286 Contractarian model of the decline in classical liberalism
by Randall Holcombe - 287-295 The economics of the women's movement
by Janet Hunt & Paul Rubin - 297-313 A bureaucratic theory of regulation
by Richard McKenzie & Hugh Macaulay - 315-331 On the economics of voter turnout in local school elections
by Daniel Rubinfeld & Randall Thomas - 333-348 Bureaucratic responses to tax limitation amendments
by Mark Toma & Eugenia Toma - 349-362 Voting behaviour in a system of concordant democracy
by Heinrich Ursprung - 379-382 Incentives in public decision-making
by Edward Clarke
January 1980, Volume 35, Issue 2
- 129-136 On the evaluation of corporate contributions
by Gerald Keim & Roger Meiners & Louis Frey - 137-143 Corporate contributions: Some additional considerations
by James Bennett & Manuel Johnson - 145-149 The evaluation of corporate contributions: A reply
by Ferdinand Levy & Gloria Shatto - 151-184 Vote trading: An experimental study
by Richard McKelvey & Peter Ordeshook - 185-190 The Electoral College and voter participation rates: An exploratory note
by Richard Cebula & Dennis Murphy - 191-195 Monopolies, market interdependencies and the logic of collective action: some critical comments on Mancur Olson's group theory
by Hersch Fischler - 197-203 On the size of vote trades
by James Enelow - 205-218 Routes and paths of comparison and choice
by Murat Sertel & Alexander Bellen - 219-227 Impossibility results in the axiomatic theory of intertemporal choice
by Edward Packel - 229-239 An axiomated family of power indices for simple n-person games
by Edward Packel & John Deegan - 241-252 The strategic inconsistency of Paretian liberalism
by Roy Gardner - 253-256 Reviews
by Gordon Tullock & Peter Hill
January 1980, Volume 35, Issue 1
- 3-15 Revenue sharing and local public spending: The Italian experience
by Giorgio Brosio & David Hyman & Walter Santagata - 17-26 Optimal jurisdictions and the economic theory of the state: Or, anarchy and one-world government are only corner solutions
by Laurence Moss - 27-36 Economic competition and political competition: A comment
by William Brown & Gary Santoni - 37-43 Externalities and zoning
by William Fischel - 45-57 Are public goods public goods?
by Jacob Meerman - 59-74 Long-run efficiency and property rights sharing for pollution control
by Gene Mumy - 75-83 The market for special interest campaign funds: An exploratory approach
by Jonathan Silberman & Gilbert Yochum - 85-95 Efficiency and compensation of public officials
by Uri Ben-Zion & Menahem Spiegel - 97-120 The allocation of political monies: Economic interest groups
by W. Welch - 121-121 Public choice
by Peter Bernholz - 123-127 Reviews
by W. Eecke & Karen Vaughn
September 1979, Volume 34, Issue 3
- 255-269 Federal tax burdens and grant benefits to states: The impact of imperfect representation
by James Bennett & Eddie Mayberry - 271-284 The cost of voting: Its fiscal impact on government
by Robert McCormick & Richard McKenzie - 285-295 Property tax consciousness
by Peter Ordeshook - 297-315 Dynamic models of the voter's decision calculus: Incorporating retrospective considerations into rational-choice models of individual voting behavior
by Martin Zechman - 317-331 Local fiscal crises and intergovernmental grants: A suggested hypothesis
by Roger Faith - 333-357 Budget-maximizing agencies and efficiency in government
by Thomas McGuire & Michael Coiner & Larry Spancake - 359-363 Non-monetary competition for students within the university
by John Lewis & T. Cott - 365-380 Legislative profits and the rate of change of money wages: A graphical exposition
by Manfred Gärtner - 381-397 The expenditure effects of alternative public supply institutions
by Robert Deacon - 399-418 The electoral lottery: Decisions to run for Congress
by Linda Fowler - 419-434 Outcomes of logrolling in the bargaining set and democratic theory: Some conjectures
by Joe Oppenheimer - 435-461 Some aspects of the political economy of election campaign contribution laws
by Peter Aranson & Melvin Hinich - 463-466 A note on the optimal use of clearance procedures
by David Weimer - 467-471 Bureaucracy and grants-in-aid
by Joseph Magaddino & Roger Meiners - 473-479 Coupon rationing and rent-seeking bureaucrats
by Marilyn Flowers & Richard Stroup - 481-491 On the mutuality of interests between bureaus and high demand review committees: A perverse result
by Robert Mackay & Carolyn Weaver - 493-498 Complexity as a characteristic of policies in Albert Breton's economic theory of representative government
by Lawrence Bezeau - 499-504 Government as a super Becker-altruist
by Bruce Bolnick - 505-507 A further note on migration patterns and local government policy toward public education
by Anthony Ostrosky
June 1979, Volume 34, Issue 2
- 141-156 A simple direction model of electoral competition
by Steven Matthews - 157-175 Vote trading in a legislative context: An analysis of cooperative and noncooperative strategic voting
by James Enelow & David Koehler - 177-188 Nonmanipulable multi-valued social decision functions
by Allan Feldman - 189-200 Abstention in two-candidate and three-candidate elections when voters use mixed strategies
by Bernard Grofman - 201-215 Electoral College reform and the distribution of voting power
by Douglas Blair - 217-230 Proportional and progressive income taxation with utility-maximizing governments
by James Buchanan & Roger Congleton - 231-232 On the appeal (or is it repeal?) of minimum wage laws: A reply to Browning
by Frank Steindl - 233-254 Reviews
by David Friedman & Alan Waters & John Moore & Bernard Lentz & Gordon Tullock
March 1979, Volume 34, Issue 1
- 5-14 Rent-seeking competition in political parties
by Robert McCormick & Robert Tollison - 45-54 Public interest lobbies: membership and influence
by James Kau & Paul Rubin - 55-63 Public versus private provision of collective goods and services: garbage collection revisited
by James Bennett & Manuel Johnson - 69-85 The effect of electoral rules on voting behavior: the electoral college and shift voting
by Richard Bensel & M. Sanders - 87-97 Social welfare functions when preferences are convex, strictly monotonic, and continuous
by Ehud Kalai & Eitan Muller & Mark Satterthwaite - 99-116 Class conflict and fairness in “democratic capitalism”
by Yvo Dirickx & Murat Sertel - 117-122 The impact of institutional structures on city-country consolidation outcomes
by Mark Toma - 123-127 Pareto-optimality and gains-form-trade: a public choice interpretation
by Charles Rowley & Martin Walker - 129-130 Living costs, the Tiebout hypothesis, and welfare policy
by Richard Cebula
December 1978, Volume 33, Issue 4
- 5-26 Pigouvian policies in closed behavioral systems
by Peter Aranson & Terry Ferrar & Peter Sassone - 27-43 Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo
by Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal - 45-65 Testing political economy’s ‘as if’ proposition: is the median income voter really decisive?
by Robert Inman - 67-83 The right to vote no: revising the voting system and resuscitating the F-Y voter
by Francisco Arcelus & Gary Mauser & Z. Spindler - 85-96 State tax structure and the supply of AFDC assistance
by Hugh Spall - 97-113 A collective goods model of pluralist political systems
by John Chamberlin - 115-130 Agency budgets and the use of eligibility rules
by Robin Walther & Jeffrey Chapman - 131-134 A note on nonwhite migration: welfare levels and the political process: a comment
by S. Jones-Hendrickson - 135-136 Nonwhite migration, welfare, and politics: a re-examination
by Richard Cebula
January 1978, Volume 33, Issue 3
- 5-13 Cycles in senatorial voting behavior: implications for the optimal frequency of elections
by Ryan Amacher & William Boyes - 15-26 An economic analysis of the voting on Michigan's tax and expenditure limitation amendment
by Steve Mariotti - 27-44 The rational voter: an analysis of two Atlanta referenda on rapid transit
by Larry Schroeder & David Sjoquist - 45-63 Constitutional guarantees and the distribution of power and wealth
by Jürgen Backhaus - 65-82 On the stability of logrolling outcomes in stochastic games
by Peter Bernholz - 83-92 Campaign spending and votes: a reconsideration
by R. Johnston - 93-97 Revenue sharing and monopoly government
by Richard McKenzie & Robert Staaf - 99-106 Election periods and state tax policy cycles
by John Mikesell - 107-111 Donor optimization and the food stamp program: comment
by Edgar Browning - 113-117 On the political economy of food stamps
by J. Giertz & Dennis Sullivan - 119-123 A note on providing public goods through voluntary contributions
by Clarence Morrison - 125-127 An alternative campaign finance reform: public “laundries” for secret cash contributions
by John Beck - 129-133 Reviews
by Robert Tollison & Barry Keating & James Buchanan
September 1978, Volume 33, Issue 2
- 5-16 A linear inequality method of establishing certain social choice conjectures
by J. Chamberlin & M. Cohen - 17-31 An economic approach to social choice — II
by Theodore Bergstrom & Trout Rader - 33-48 Social choice and economic growth
by Nathaniel Beck - 49-67 The inevitability of the “paradox of redistribution” in the allocation of voting weights
by Dietrich Fischer & Andrew Schotter - 69-82 The effects of abstentions on election outcomes
by William Gehrlein & Peter Fishburn - 83-102 Some evidence on non-voting models in the spatial theory of electoral competition
by Melvin Hinich - 103-115 Revealed public preference and social utility
by Perry Shapiro - 117-120 The collective allocation of commodities in a democratic society: a generalization
by Lawrence Kenny - 121-126 What happens when majority rule breaks down?
by Colin Bell - 127-133 Empirical estimates for the likelihood of a divided verdict in a presidental election
by Samuel Merrill
March 1978, Volume 33, Issue 1
- 5-17 Pareto on public choice
by Jurgen Backhaus - 19-28 The evaluation of corporate contributions
by Ferdinand Levy & Gloria Shatto - 29-39 The ‘crowding-out’ effect of governmental transfers on private charitable contributions
by Burton Abrams & Mark Schitz - 41-53 Coordination and the management of estuarine water quality
by Mark Sproule-Jones - 55-59 Optimality and the institutional structure of bureaucracy
by Randall Holcombe & Edward Price - 61-69 On the distributional implications of collective provision of public goods
by Mo-Yin Tam & Joseph Persky - 71-74 Politicians and property rights
by Adam Gifford & Gary Santoni - 85-90 Strategic voting and the borda method
by William Ludwin - 91-93 More on the appeal of minimum wage laws
by Edgar Browning - 95-100 Fiscal illusion, the nature of public goods and equation specification
by Vincent Munley & Kenneth Greene
December 1977, Volume 32, Issue 1
- 1-10 Political coalition bargaining behaviour
by Jeffrey Callen & Leslie Roos - 11-38 The unified solution of the Cross/Coddington model of the bargaining process
by Alan Carling - 39-50 The demand for government transfers: A look at the recipients
by Charles Knoeber - 51-65 The application of an agency decisionmaking model
by David Shapiro & Robert Shelton - 67-83 Unanimity in the supreme court: A game-theoretic explanation of the decision in the white house tapes case
by Steven Brams & Douglas Muzzio - 85-99 Citizen ignorance and political activity
by Thomas Dalton - 101-111 A two-stage hybrid mechanism for collective choice
by Earl Brubaker - 113-121 An analysis of migration patterns and local government policy toward public education in the United States
by Richard Cebula - 123-129 A note on progression and public sector size
by Geoffrey Brennan - 131-135 A note on political participation as consumption behavior
by W. Crain & Thomas Deaton - 137-142 A concise proof of theorem on manipulation of social choice functions
by Peter Gärdenfors - 143-149 State budget sizes and the marginal productivity of governors: An extension
by R. Hafer - 151-154 More on nonwhite migration, welfare levels, and the political process
by Rishi Kumar - 155-156 Nonwhite migration, welfare, and politics—A reply
by Richard Cebula - 157-174 Book reviews
by Bruno Frey & John Harsanyi & James Buchanan & Eric Uslaner & Jeffrey Richelson & Nicholas Miller & Harold Hochman
September 1977, Volume 31, Issue 1
- 1-22 Presidential strategy for the appointment of supreme court justices
by Stuart Teger - 23-35 Choice of compulsory insurance schemes under adverse selection
by William Johnson - 37-52 Market structure and campaign contributions
by Russell Pittman - 53-77 An economic approach to school integration: Public choice with tie-ins
by Thomas Borcherding - 79-110 Conditions on social choice functions
by Jeffrey Richelson - 111-119 Legislative profits and the economic theory of representative voting: An empirical investigation
by Burton Abrams - 121-128 An empirical investigation of voting on energy issues
by Albert Danielsen & Paul Rubin - 129-133 On the efficiency of federal R&D spending: A public choice approach
by Albert Link - 135-138 Probability of a tie election
by Howard Margolis - 139-141 Bureaucratic performance and budgetary reward: A reply and reformulation
by Ronald Warren - 143-145 Bureaucratic performance and budgetary reward: A test of the hypotheses with an alternative specification
by Thomas McCaleb - 147-150 The expanding public sector: Wagner squared
by James Buchanan & Gordon Tullock - 151-155 A note on the decision rules of public regulatory agencies
by Charles Wright - 157-162 Campaign expenditures and election outcomes: A critical note
by J. Fred Giertz & Dennis Sullivan
June 1977, Volume 30, Issue 1
- 1-21 The dilemma of a paretian liberal: Some consequences of Sen's theorem
by John Aldrich - 23-28 “Social preference” and game theory: A comment on “the dilemma of a paretian liberal”
by Nicholas Miller - 29-34 Liberal games: Further comments on social choice and game theory
by John Aldrich - 35-42 Some new impossibility theorems
by John Ferejohn & David Grether - 43-50 The Borda game
by Roy Gardner - 51-75 Logrolling, vote trading, and the paradox of voting: A game-theoretical overview
by Nicholas Miller - 77-105 Dynamic games of collective action
by Norman Schofield - 107-118 Homogeneity, independence, and power indices
by Philip Straffin
March 1977, Volume 29, Issue 2
- 15-26 Alternative versions of the demand-revealing process
by Martin Loeb - 27-35 Practical problems and practical solutions
by Gordon Tullock - 37-49 Some aspects of the demand-revealing process
by Edward Clarke - 51-63 The demand-revealing process as a welfare indicator
by Gordon Tullock - 65-70 Justice in voting by demand revelation
by I. Good - 71-77 Ethical foundations of the demand-revealing process
by T. Nicolaus Tideman - 79-94 Imperfect personal information and the demand revealing process: A sampling approach
by Jerry Green & Jean-Jacques Laffont - 95-102 The group incentive properties of mechanisms for the provision of public goods
by Elaine Bennett & David Conn - 103-105 Demand-revealing process, coalitions, and public goods
by Gordon Tullock - 107-124 Some limitations of demand revelaing processes
by Theodore Groves & John Ledyard - 125-128 Some limitations of demand revealing processes: Comment
by T. Nicolaus Tideman & Gordon Tullock