Content
January 1983, Volume 41, Issue 3
- 449-450 A note on voter participation rates in the United States
by Richard Cebula - 451-454 A limited defense of Pareto optimal redistribution: Comment
by E. Pasour - 455-460 Reviews
by Joseph Reid & Robert Sugden & Dwight Lee
January 1983, Volume 41, Issue 2
- 1-1 Editor's note
by Gordon Tullock - 241-250 An approach to empirical studies of voting paradoxes: An update and extension
by John Dobra - 251-260 On the stability of legislative outcomes
by Stephen Hoenack - 261-270 Why so much stability?: Another opinion
by Richard Niemi - 271-283 The voting behavior of bureaucrats: Some empirical evidence
by James Bennett & William Orzechowski - 285-293 The impact of tenure on the flow of federal benefits to SMSA's
by Lisa Kiel & Richard McKenzie - 295-306 Banking sector influence on the relationship of Congress to the Federal Reserve System
by Neil Skaggs & Cheryl Wasserkrug - 307-310 The Tiebout hypothesis in the United States: An analysis of black consumer-voters, 1970–75
by Richard Cebula & K. Avery - 311-314 Federal budget cuts: Bureaucrats trim the meat, not the fat
by David Laband - 315-319 On the Margolis ‘thought experiment,’ and the applicability of demand-revealing mechanisms to large-group decisions
by Earl Brubaker - 321-325 Reply to Brubaker and Tullock
by Howard Margolis - 325-325 Editorial note
by Gordon Tullock - 327-331 Conflicting analysis of a ‘Conflicting commons’: Comment
by Dwight Lee - 333-335 Conflicting analysis of a ‘Conflicting commons’: Reply
by Bruce Yandle - 337-349 Reviews
by Howard Dickman & William Mitchell & George Uhimchuk & John Dobra
January 1983, Volume 41, Issue 1
- 1-5 Introduction
by A. Meltzer & Peter Ordeshook & Thomas Romer - 7-53 A strategic calculus of voting
by Thomas Palfrey & Howard Rosenthal - 55-61 Models of voter turnout: a brief idiosyncratic review
by Bernard Grofman - 63-100 A spatial model with party activists: implications for electoral dynamics
by John Aldrich - 133-137 The objectives of private and public judges
by Paul Rubin - 139-143 The objectives of private and public judges
by Chester Spatt - 145-175 Control of conflicts of interest in class-action suits
by Lewis Kornhauser - 177-179 Control of conflicts of interest in class-action suits
by Chester Spatt - 181-222 The evolution of tax structures
by James Alt - 223-228 Is there a demand for progressivity?
by Gerald Kramer - 229-235 Implications of dynamic optimal taxation for the evolution of tax structures
by Finn Kydland
January 1983, Volume 40, Issue 3
- 237-247 Variation of the electorate: Veto and purge
by Roy Gardner - 249-261 Scoring rule sensitivity to weight selection
by William Gehrlein & Peter Fishburn - 263-279 Winners, blockers, and the status quo: Simple collective decision games and the core
by James Laing & Sampei Nakabayashi & Benjamin Slotznick - 281-291 Some experimental results that fail to support the competitive solution
by Richard McKelvey & Peter Ordeshook - 293-305 The power of the chairman
by Richard Niemi & Bo Bjurulf & Gordon Blewis - 307-316 A note on the paradox of voting: Anonymous preference profiles and May's formula
by Sven Berg & Bo Bjurulf - 317-321 On Plott's pairwise symmetry condition for majority rule equilibrium
by James Enelow & Melvin Hinisch - 323-328 An exegesis of Farquharson's Theory of Voting
by Richard Niemi - 329-336 On evaluating income distributions: Rank dominance, the Suppes-Sen grading principle of justice, and Pareto optimality
by Rubin Saposnik
January 1983, Volume 40, Issue 2
- 117-133 Philanthropic motives and contribution policy
by Uri Ben-Zion & Uriel Spiegel - 135-154 Demands for public spending: An attitudinal approach
by James Ferris - 155-164 Random timing of elections and the political business cycle
by Victor Ginsburgh & Philippe Michel - 165-174 On the distribution of federal taxes and expenditures, and the new war between the states
by Randall Holcombe & Asghar Zardkoohi - 175-186 Expenditure effects of metropolitan tax base sharing: A public choice analysis
by Dolores Martin & James Schmidt - 187-194 An analysis of support for tax limitation referenda
by Robert Stein & Keith Hamm & Patricia Freeman - 195-201 In search of optimum ‘relative unanimity’
by Richard Cebula & Milton Kafoglis - 203-209 Economic competition and political competition: An empirical note
by Thomas Dilorenzo - 211-216 Institutional entropy, again
by Richard Auster - 217-225 A note on demand-revealing
by Howard Margolis - 227-230 A further consideration of coalitions under the demand-revealing process
by Melville McMillan - 231-232 Towards a theory of yes-no-voting: A comment
by Friedel Bolle
January 1983, Volume 40, Issue 1
- 5-5 Editorial
by Gordon Tullock - 7-19 Public choice in local judicial systems
by Josef Broder & A. Schmid - 21-39 Pre-meeting discussions and the possibility of coalition-breaking procedures in majority rule committees
by Elizabeth Hoffman & Charles Plott - 41-52 Political terrorism and the size of government: A positive institutional analysis of violent political activity
by Richard Kirk - 53-69 Presidential politics, budget deficits, and monetary policy in the United States; 1960–1976
by Leroy Laney & Thomas Willett - 71-87 The determination of local public expenditures and the principal and agent relation: A case study
by Sharon Megdal - 89-94 Recontracting, trustworthiness, and the stability of vote exchanges
by James Coleman - 95-99 Property rights in bureaucracies and bureaucratic efficiency
by John Dobra - 101-103 Addictive goods and the growth of government
by Franz Jessen - 105-109 Economic agents and the level of pollution control
by Bruce Yandle - 111-116 Review
by Gordon Tullock
January 1982, Volume 39, Issue 3
- 333-342 Off-budget activities of local government: The bane of the tax revolt
by James Bennett & Thomas Dilorenzo - 343-360 Beliefs and errors in voting choices: A restatement of the theory of fiscal illusion
by Richard Carter - 361-370 A decentralized mechanism for siting hazardous waste disposal facilities
by David Goetze - 371-386 The Section 8-Existing Housing program's administrative fee structure: A formal model of bureau behavior with empirical evidence
by Laura Langbein - 387-398 An econometric analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court's certiorari decisions
by Jan Palmer - 399-414 A politico-financial model of local authority rents and rate fund contributions in the U.K
by Martin Ricketts - 415-420 Toward an informational dynamics of collective choice
by Pam Brown - 421-425 A model of asymmetric bureaucratic inertia and bias
by R. Congleton - 427-433 Pareto optimality of policy proposals with probabilistic voting
by Peter Coughlin
January 1982, Volume 39, Issue 2
- 221-243 The growth of government in Italy: Evidence from 1861 to 1979
by Michele Fratianni & Franco Spinelli - 245-268 Centralized vote-trading
by Kenneth Koford - 269-276 In defense of the downtrodden: Usury laws?
by William Boyes - 277-282 A limited defense of Pareto optimal redistribution
by J. Giertz - 283-289 The median voter and his elasticity of substitution
by Kenneth Greene - 291-297 Peltzman on regulation and politics
by Victor Goldberg - 299-300 Peltzman on regulation and politics: Reply
by Sam Peltzman - 301-317 Bureaucratic productivity: The case of agricultural research revisited
by E. Pasour & Marc Johnson - 319-329 Bureaucratic productivity: The case of agricultural research revisited — A rejoinder
by Vernon Ruttan - 331-332 Review
by Gordon Tullock
January 1982, Volume 39, Issue 1
- 1-3 Introduction
by A. Meltzer & Peter Ordeshook & Thomas Romer - 5-27 The applied theory of regulation: Political economy at the Interstate Commerce Commission
by Marcus Alexis - 29-32 The applied theory of regulation: Political economy at the Interstate Commerce Commission
by Thomas Moore - 33-66 Legislative choice of regulatory forms: Legal process or administrative process?
by Morris Fiorina - 67-71 Legislative choice of regulatory forms
by Albert Nichols - 73-106 A political theory of regulation with some observations on railway abandonments
by Richard Barke & William Riker - 107-111 A political theory of regulation with some observations on railway abandonments
by Mancur Olson - 113-142 Representative voter or bureaucratic manipulation: An examination of public finances in California before and after Proposition 13
by Perry Shapiro & Jon Sonstelie - 143-145 Representative voter or bureaucratic manipulation: An examination of public finances in California before and after Proposition 13
by Allan Zelenitz - 147-169 The impacts of Proposition 13 upon the California political system: Re-regulating the intergovernmental system
by John Kirlin - 171-178 The impacts of Proposition 13 upon the California political system: Re-regulating the intergovernmental system What system? What changes?
by Patrick Larkey - 179-184 Proposition 13 and fiscal federalism
by Dieter Bös - 185-212 Equilibrium and efficiency under pure entitlement systems
by Edward Green - 213-219 Entitlement theory: Prospects and problems
by Thomas Schwartz
January 1982, Volume 38, Issue 3
- 225-241 Crisis of the tax state
by Dieter Bös - 243-252 Utility profits, fiscal illusion, and local public expenditures
by Thomas DiLorenzo - 253-262 How powerful are public bureaucrats as voters?
by Bruno Frey & Werner Pommerehne - 263-269 Senatorial responsiveness, the characteristics of the polity and the political cycle
by Kenneth Greene & Hadi Salavitabar - 271-280 Demand functions and the valuation of public goods
by Eli Noam - 281-303 Interest groups in democracies — How influential are they?
by Friedrich Schneider & Jörg Naumann - 305-316 Closeness counts in horseshoes and dancing ... and elections
by Fred Thompson - 317-327 Conflicting commons
by Bruce Yandle - 329-334 Review
by Thomas Willett
January 1982, Volume 38, Issue 2
- 113-128 Microdata estimation of school expenditure levels: An alternative to the median voter approach
by John Akin & Michael Lea - 129-138 A critique on the effectiveness of tax-expenditure limitations
by Dale Bails - 139-147 The impact of labor costs on municipal finances
by William Hunter - 149-165 Optimal voting rules under uncertainty
by Kenneth Koford - 167-170 More thought about demand revealing
by Gordon Tullock - 171-179 An economic analysis of crime rates, punishment, and the social consequences of crime
by Göran Skogh & Charles Stuart - 181-196 The overstated economy: Implications of positive public economics for national accounting
by Z. Spindler - 197-203 Unemployment rates and political outcomes: An incentive for manufacturing a political business cycle
by Ryan Amacher & William Boyes - 205-209 Does there exist a political business cycle: A Box-Tiao analysis
by Nathaniel Beck - 211-217 An alternate test of the Tiebout hypothesis
by Vincent Munley - 219-224 Book reviews
by Dwight Lee & Gordon Tullock & Robert Tollison
March 1982, Volume 38, Issue 1
- 3-19 Why so much stability? An optimistic view of the possibility of rational legislative decisionmaking
by Kenneth Koford - 21-33 Improving the behavior of public officials: Changing the method of compensation and changing officials
by Charles Knoeber - 35-53 Comparative growth and comparative advantage: Tests of the effects of interest group behavior on foreign trade patterns
by Peter Murrell - 55-72 Taxes and residential choice
by Chi-Yuan Tsai - 73-85 Voluntary purchase of public goods
by Douglas Young - 87-91 A thought experiment on demand-revealing mechanisms
by Howard Margolis - 93-94 The Electoral College and voter participation rates: Comment
by Douglas Blair - 95-96 The Electoral College and voter participation rates: Reply
by Richard Cebula & Dennis Murphy - 97-112 Textbook public choice: A review essay
by William Mitchell
January 1981, Volume 37, Issue 3
- 389-402 Party policy and campaign costs in a multi-constituency model of electoral competition
by David Austen-Smith - 403-423 Voter preferences, simple electoral games, and equilibria in two-candidate contests
by Lee Dutter - 425-434 Efficacy, power and equity under approval voting
by Peter Fishburn & Steven Brams - 435-445 Instability in voluntary contributions based upon jointness in supply
by Ralph Frasca - 447-472 Agenda control by budget maximizers in a multi-bureau setting
by Robert Mackay & Carolyn Weaver - 473-486 The firm's objective function as a collective choice problem
by Frank Milne - 487-501 The universal-instability theorem
by Thomas Schwartz - 503-519 Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice
by Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast - 521-529 Political power and the market for governors
by Burton Abrams - 531-546 Choice models and voting behaviour: The case of the Dutch electorate
by Fred Bronner & Robert Hoog - 547-558 Adverse selection and Pareto improvements through compulsory insurance
by B. Dahlby - 559-568 An empirical assessment of the factor-supplier pressure group hypothesis
by Thomas Dilorenzo - 569-578 The expenditure effects of restricting competition in local public service industries: The case of special districts
by Thomas Dilorenzo - 579-584 Agenda control and budget size: An extension of the Romer-Rosenthal model
by Marilyn Flowers - 585-588 Legislative profits and the rate of change of money wages: A comment
by Chris Goodrich - 589-593 Legislative profits and the rate of change of money wages: A reply
by Manfred Gärtner - 595-601 Government as a super Becker-altruist: A comment
by R. Terrebonne - 603-606 Government as a super Becker-altruist: A reply
by Bruce Bolnick - 607-608 Long-run efficiency and property rights sharing for pollution control: A comment
by Brian Beavis & Martin Walker - 609-609 Long-run efficiency and property rights sharing for pollution control: A reply
by Gene Mumy - 611-620 Reviews
by James Buchanan & James Bennett & Carl Dahlman & William Niskanen & Gordon Tullock
January 1981, Volume 37, Issue 2
- 189-204 Why so much stability
by Gordon Tullock - 207-218 The determinants of voting by the National Labor Relations Board on unfair labor practice cases: 1955–1975
by Charles Delorme & R. Hill & Norman Wood - 219-230 Citations as an indicator of classic works and major contributors in social choice
by Paul Downing & Elizabeth Stafford - 231-245 Towards a theory of yes-no voting
by Roger Faith & James Buchanan - 247-260 Nuclear proliferation and the probability of nuclear war
by Michael Intriligator & Dagobert Brito - 261-274 The size of government
by James Kau & Paul Rubin - 275-285 Second best and monopoly: A cautionary tale
by Clarence Morrison - 287-305 An essay on the rationality of economic policy: The test-case of the electional cycle
by Martin Paldam - 307-320 Bureaucratic politics and the labor market
by William Peirce - 321-325 Voting with one's feet: A brief note on the case of public welfare and the American Indian
by Leonard Carlson & Richard Cebula - 327-330 A note on the determinants of AFDC policies
by Richard Cebula - 331-335 Conflict of interest and congressional voting: A note
by Henry Chappell - 337-342 Representation of high demand constituencies on review committees: A research note
by Susan Cowart - 343-348 A note on politics and franchise bidding
by Robert Ekelund & Richard Saba - 349-356 The impact of different government units in the regulation of the workplace environment
by Michael Marlow - 357-363 A theory of government enterprise: University Ph. D. production
by David Sisk - 365-370 Revenue sharing and monopoly government: A comment
by David Friedman & Michael Kurth - 371-374 Revenue sharing and monopoly government: A reply
by Richard McKenzie & Robert Staaf - 375-376 The Borda Game: A correction
by Roy Gardner - 377-388 Reviews
by Thomas Willett & D. Laband & Todd Sandler & David Davies & Douglass North
January 1981, Volume 37, Issue 1
- 5-31 The demand for military expenditures: An international comparison
by Leonard Dudley & Claude Montmarquette - 33-39 Comment: The demand for military expenditures: An international comparison
by Thomas Borcherding - 41-59 Strategic arms limitation treaties and innovations in weapons technology
by Dagobert Brito & Michael Intriligator - 61-68 Strategic arms limitation treaties and innovations in weapons technology
by Robert Mackay - 69-100 Regulation, redistribution, and public choice
by Peter Aranson & Peter Ordeshook - 101-105 Comments on Aranson & Ordeshook's regulation, redistribution, and public choice
by Thomas Moore - 107-132 Legislators, bureaucrats, and locational decisions
by R. Arnold - 133-140 Legislators, bureaucrats and locational decisions and beyond
by Joe Oppenheimer - 141-178 Municipal pension funding: A theory and some evidence
by Dennis Epple & Katherine Schipper - 179-187 "Municipal pension funding: A theory and some evidence" by Dennis Epple and Katherine Schipper
by Robert Inman
January 1981, Volume 36, Issue 3
- 391-412 California school finance: The 1970s decade
by W Stubblebine & David Kennard - 413-423 The post-Proposition 13 environment in California and its consequences for education
by Werner Hirsch - 425-439 Local authority education expenditure in England and Wales: Why standards differ and the impact of government grants
by Richard Jackman & John Papadachi - 449-474 On setting the agenda for Pennsylvania school finance reform: An exercise in giving policy advice
by Robert Inman - 481-507 Imperfect capital markets and the public provision of education
by P. Hare & D. Ulph - 515-532 An equity perspective on community college finance
by Susan Nelson & David Breneman - 537-550 The finance of recurrent education: Some theoretical considerations
by Maurice Peston - 551-571 The role of the state in financing recurrent education: Lessons from European experience
by Howard Glennerster - 573-577 Comments on M. Peston and H. Glennerster
by Mark Blaug - 585-612 The university department as a non-profit labor cooperative
by Estelle James & Egon Neuberger - 619-637 Extra-governmental powers in public schooling: The unions and the courts
by E. West & R. Staaf - 641-645 Comments on E. G. West and R. J. Staaf
by Ronald Ehrenberg - 647-650 Rejoinder
by E. West & R. Staaf
January 1981, Volume 36, Issue 2
- 209-234 Money and votes: A simultaneous equation model
by W. Welch - 235-252 The advantages of contingent valuation methods for benefit-cost analysis
by David Brookshire & Thomas Crocker - 253-271 Political and economic determinants of county government pay
by Bernard Lentz - 273-285 A median voter analysis of variations in the use of property taxes among local governments
by David Sjoquist - 301-312 Campaign contributions and voting on the cargo preference bill: A comparison of simultaneous models
by Henry Chappell - 313-322 Budget-maximizing governmental agencies: An empirical test
by Thomas McGuire - 323-328 Coalitions under demand revealing
by T. Tideman & Gordon Tullock - 329-336 The ‘crowding out’ effect of federal government outlay decisions: An empirical note
by Richard Cebula & Christopher Carlos & James Koch - 337-344 The construction of the demand for public goods and the theory of income redistribution
by Richard McKenzie - 345-349 Daylight Savings: An endogenous law
by James Adams - 351-371 Reviews
by Ulrich Lith & Morgan Reynolds & Joseph Reid & Geoffrey Brennan & Jürgen Backhaus & Gordon Tullock