The political process and the use of debt financing by state governments
Empirical evidence offered in this study suggests that decisions by state government officials to effect debt-financed spending depend in part on the state's gubernatorial election cycle. More specifically, the results reveal relative increases in state debt issues in anticipation of elections, and furthermore, they reveal that such increases are more significant for states characterized by high interparty political competition. While theoretical limitations preclude a definitive explanation for these results, the evidence is consistent with a view of state political markets where incumbent parties manipulate public policy so as to enhance the probability of success in pending elections. This insight is significant in that it suggests a relationship between public policy decisions and election cycles in a context heretofore unexplored. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1986
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- Wagner, Richard E, 1977. "Economic Manipulation for Political Profit: Macroeconomic Consequences and Constitutional Implications," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(3), pages 395-410.
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