Content
January 1986, Volume 49, Issue 1
- 69-77 Why do corporations contribute to the Nature Conservancy?
by James Griffith & Charles Knoeber - 79-97 Property taxes, tax-cost illusion and desired education expenditures
by R. Lankford - 99-100 Review
by Randall Holcombe
January 1986, Volume 48, Issue 3
- 201-215 The political process and the use of debt financing by state governments
by William Baber & Pradyot Sen - 217-227 Efficient allocation and unanimous consent with incomplete demand disclosures?
by R. Brubaker - 229-244 Non-optimal unanimous agreement
by Randall Holcombe - 245-253 Determinants of the political participation of women
by Marshall Medoff - 255-263 Fragmentation and the growth of local government
by Mark Schneider - 265-270 Rentless rent-seeking and abnormal returns
by Bruce Yandle - 273-290 Optimal majorities for decisions of varying importance
by Bengt-Arne Wickström - 291-294 Comment
by Gordon Tullock - 295-298 Comment on a comment
by Bengt-Arne Wickström
January 1986, Volume 48, Issue 2
- 101-112 Economic value of an in-house editorship
by John McDowell & Ryan Amacher - 113-124 Reinterpreting the role of inflation in politico-economic models
by Robert Michaels - 125-145 Interest groups and the size of government
by Dennis Mueller & Peter Murrell - 147-155 The politics of race in higher education: Governing boards and constituents
by G. Sav - 157-174 Endogenous supranational policy decisions: The Common Agricultural Policy of the European Community
by Harald Witzke - 175-181 Transfer seeking and avoidance: On the full social costs of rent seeking
by Elie Appelbaum & Eliakim Katz - 183-187 On the voting participation of public bureaucrats
by Bert Jaarsma & Arthur Schram & Frans Winden - 189-194 Tax/compensation schemes: Misleading advice in a rent-seeking society
by Richard McKenzie - 195-199 Reviews
by William Mitchell & W. Smith
January 1986, Volume 48, Issue 1
- 3-25 An agenda for the study of institutions
by Elinor Ostrom - 27-35 Municipal residency laws and local public budgets
by Stephen Mehay & Kenneth Seiden - 37-48 On the inefficient extraction of rents by dictators
by Wayne Brough & Mwangi Kimenyi - 49-54 Religion as DUP activity
by Jagdish Bhagwati & T. Srinivasan - 55-63 Representative versus direct democracy: A Tiebout test of relative performance
by Rexford Santerre - 65-69 A note on the Tiebout-Tullock hypothesis: The period 1975–1980
by Richard Cebula & Milton Kafoglis - 71-79 A note on the importance of cost structures for the behavior of Political Action Committees
by Daniel Richards - 81-87 On nationalizing private property and the present value of dictators
by John Lott & David Reiffen - 89-91 On nationalizing private property and the present value of dictators: Reply
by Adam Gifford & Roy Kenney - 93-99 Review article
by Charles Rowley
January 1985, Volume 47, Issue 3
- 425-436 The limits of the equity-efficiency tradeoff
by Donald Keenan & Paul Rubin - 437-457 Distribution of jointly owned private goods by the demand-revealing process: Applications to divorce settlements and estate administration
by Charles Laine - 459-477 Government expenditure and economic growth in the developed countries: 1952–76
by Daniel Landau - 479-490 The experimental search for free riders: Some reflections and observations
by Thomas McCaleb & Richard Wagner - 491-508 Tocqueville and public choice
by L. Wade - 509-517 Politics, deficits, and the Laffer curve
by Roger Waud - 519-525 Voter power and electricity prices
by Walter Primeaux & Patrick Mann - 527-529 The public interest and rent seeking
by E. Pasour - 531-534 Reviews
by James Buchanan & Frank Forman
January 1985, Volume 47, Issue 2
- 313-335 On the design of optimal mechanisms for the Arrow-Hahn-McKenzie economy
by Clark Robinson & Gerry Suchanek - 337-347 Can donations reduce a donor's welfare?
by Jeffrey Weiss - 349-370 The vulnerability of point-voting schemes to preference variation and strategic manipulation
by Shmuel Nitzan - 371-376 A precise restatement and extension of Black's theorem on voting orders
by Richard Niemi & Rodney Gretlein - 377-387 Paradox of voting under an urn model: The effect of homogeneity
by Sven Berg - 389-403 A statistical model for Condorcet efficiency based on simulation under spatial model assumptions
by Samuel Merrill - 405-424 An application of the multicandidate calculus of voting to the 1972 and 1976 German federal elections
by Lee Dutter
January 1985, Volume 47, Issue 1
- 7-62 Money and votes reconsidered: congressional elections, 1972–1982
by Gary Jacobson - 63-111 Patterns of political action committee contributions to the 1980 campaigns for the United States House of Representatives
by Keith Poole & Thomas Romer - 113-119 The specification of models of campaign finance
by James Kau & Paul Rubin - 121-162 Demographic factors affecting constitutional decisions: the case of municipal charters
by Steven Maser - 163-181 Progressive reform as induced institutional preferences
by Gary Miller - 183-217 Constitutional change and agenda control
by Arthur Denzau - 231-265 A positive theory of in-kind transfers and the negative income tax
by Allan Meltzer & Scott Richard - 267-303 A taxonomy of public provision
by Russell Roberts
January 1985, Volume 46, Issue 3
- 227-246 Efficient rents 1 rent-seeking behavior in the long-run
by William Corcoran & Gordon Karels - 247-258 Efficient rents 2 free entry and efficient rent seeking
by Richard Higgins & William Shughart & Robert Tollison - 259-263 Efficient rents 3 back to the bog
by Gordon Tullock - 265-274 The by-product theory of revolution: Some empirical evidence
by Phillip Cartwright & Charles Delorme & Norman Wood - 275-287 Why so much stability? The impact of agency determined stability
by Jeffrey Hill - 289-304 The effectiveness of savings and loan political action committees
by Linda Johnson - 305-309 New evidence on financial crowding out
by Richard Cebula - 311-315 Legislator specialization and the size of government
by W. Crain & Robert Tollison & Brian Goff & Diek Carlson - 317-324 Revealed preference for economics journals: Citations as dollar votes
by David Laband & John Sophocleus - 325-332 On private charity and altruism
by Oded Stark
January 1985, Volume 46, Issue 2
- 113-123 A precise method for evaluating election schemes
by Robert Bordley - 125-140 The political viability of rule-based monetary policy
by Henry Chappell & William Keech - 141-161 State and prospect of public choice: A European view
by Bruno Frey - 163-172 How elections matter: A study of U.S. senators
by A. Glazer & M. Robbins - 173-186 Majority voting and Pareto optimality
by John Goodman & Philip Porter - 187-195 The political economy of constitutional federalism
by A. Hamlin - 197-205 Tax shares and government spending in a median voter model
by Randall Holcombe & Steven Caudill - 207-214 Interstate migration, income and public school expenditures: An update of an experiment
by Garland Hadley - 215-220 The political timing of errors in inflation forecasts
by John Hill & Scott Smith - 221-223 From weakest-link to best-shot: Correction
by J. Hirshleifer
January 1985, Volume 46, Issue 1
- 3-17 A model of majority voting and growth in government expenditure
by Allan Feldman - 19-43 Running against the status quo: Institutions for direct democracy referenda and allocations over time
by Daniel Ingberman - 45-60 The politics of flatland
by Mathew McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz - 61-70 The real costs of tuition tax credits
by Edwin West - 71-78 Prison overcrowding
by J. Giertz & Peter Nardulli - 79-86 Economic incentives under contract supply of local government services
by Stephen Mehay & Rodolfo Gonzalez - 87-94 Rent-seeking over time: The continuity of capture
by Wm. Mounts & Clifford Sowell & James Lindley - 95-102 Rent-seeking, noncompensated transfers, and laws of succession: A property rights view
by David Sisk - 103-106 Remorse, elation, and the paradox of voting
by T. Tideman - 107-112 Reviews
by Morgan Reynolds
January 1985, Volume 45, Issue 3
- 241-255 Public choice and three ethical properties of politics
by Joe Oppenheimer - 257-268 Using factions to estimate preference intensity: Improving upon one person/one vote
by Robert Bordley - 269-278 The effects of voter mobility on agenda controllers
by Gary Pecquet - 279-289 Reverse revenue sharing: A modest proposal
by Dwight Lee - 291-302 A local regulator's rewards for conformity in policy
by Eli Noam - 313-331 Ceilings on campaign spending: Hypothesis and partial test with Canadian data
by K. Palda & Kristian Palda
January 1985, Volume 45, Issue 2
- 113-137 On the role of social norms in a market economy
by Gordon Bergsten - 139-153 Interrelationships among public spending preferences: A micro analysis
by James Ferris - 155-173 Causality testing of the popularity function: An empirical investigation for the Federal Republic of Germany, 1971–1982
by Gebhard Kirchgässner - 175-191 Research activities and budget allocations among Federal Reserve Banks
by Eugenia Toma & Mark Toma - 193-195 Research activities and budget allocations among Federal Reserve Banks: Comment
by Arthur Rolnick - 197-198 Research activities and budget allocations among Federal Reserve Banks: Reply
by Eugenia Toma & Mark Toma - 199-206 Some simple geometry of the welfare loss from competitive monopolies
by David Colander - 207-213 Marginal lobbying cost and the optimal amount of rent seeking
by Dwight Lee - 215-219 Federal budget cuts: Bureaucrats trim the meat, not the fat: Comment
by Michael Marlow - 221-222 Federal budget cuts: Rejoinder
by David Laband - 223-224 Review
by Michael Kurth
January 1985, Volume 45, Issue 1
- 3-17 Congressional rationality and spatial voting
by Gregory Brunk - 19-34 Expenditures and votes: In search of downward-sloping curves in the United States and Great Britain
by Alfred Cuzán & Richard Heggen - 35-47 Tax systems and tax shares
by Arthur Denzau & Robert Mackay - 49-71 ‘Putting one over on the boss’: The political economy of strategic behavior in organizations
by Thomas Hammond & Jeffrey Horn - 73-87 Monopoly rent seeking under conditions of uncertainty
by Joseph Jadlow - 89-101 Bureaucracy and the divisibility of local public output
by Rodolfo Gonzalez & Stephen Mehay - 103-103 Follow-up on the review of E.S. Savas' book, Privatizing the public sector: How to shrink government, by L.E. Lomasky (1984), Public Choice 43(2): 217–219
by Dwight Lee - 104-104 The basic facts
by E. Savas - 105-106 Response to E.S. Savas
by Loren Lomasky - 107-111 Reviews
by Philip Coelho & Gordon Tullcok & Gordon Tullock
January 1984, Volume 44, Issue 3
- 397-410 Manipulability of voting by sincere truncation of preferences
by Peter Fishburn & Steven Brams - 411-430 The political business cycle under rational voting behavior
by Ulrich Lächler - 431-441 Voting competitions with interested politicians: Platforms do not converge to the preferences of the median voter
by Ingemar Hansson & Charles Stuart - 443-451 Electoral equilibrium in double member districts
by Gary Cox - 453-456 Can a party represent its constituency?
by Amoz Kats - 457-480 The Canadian constitutional amending formula: Bargaining in the past and the future
by D. Kilgour & Terrence Levesque - 481-500 The spatial distribution of public services: A structural model of voting, educational production, and the government's allocation of educational inputs
by Donald Haurin & H. Gill - 501-505 Philantropic motives and contribution policy: A note
by Joseph Deutsch
January 1984, Volume 44, Issue 2
- 285-296 The economics of choice in the allocation of intergovernmental grants to local authories
by Gershon Alperovich - 297-305 Railway abandonments, cross-subsidies, and the theory of regulation
by William Dougan - 307-337 An economic theory of governability: Choosing policy and optimizing performance
by Mark Lichbach - 339-348 The effect of governmental structure on special district expenditures
by Stephen Mehay - 349-366 Democracy, creeping socialism, and ideological socialism in rent-seeking societies
by Erich Weede - 367-373 Are charities efficient ‘firms’? A preliminary test of the UK charitable sector
by John Cullis & Philip Jones & Constantine Thanassoulas - 375-383 Determinants of local school spending: Some consistent estimates
by Arthur Denzau & Kevin Grier - 385-388 Economic and ideological factors in congressional voting: The 1980 election
by James Kau & Paul Rubin
January 1984, Volume 44, Issue 1
- 1-1 Introduction to the series
by Allan Meltzer & Tomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal - 7-41 The pure theory of large two-candidate elections
by John Ledyard - 49-59 Expectations about voter choices
by Peter Coughlin - 61-102 Rational expectations in elections: some experimental results based on a multidimensional model
by Richard McKelvey & Peter Ordeshook - 103-145 Theories of regulation and the deregulation movement
by Theodore Keeler - 147-191 The congressional-bureaucratic system: a principal agent perspective (with applications to the SEC)
by Barry Weingast - 201-249 The political economy of Canadian constitution-making: the Canadian economic-union issue
by Thomas Courchene - 251-272 An analysis of constitutional change, Canada, 1980–82
by Albert Breton - 273-278 A comment on the papers by Thomas Courchene and Albert Breton
by Stanley Winer - 279-283 On the analysis of constitutional change in Canada
by Mark Sproule-Jones
January 1984, Volume 43, Issue 3
- 225-249 Economic justice and economic power: An inquiry into distributive justice and political stability
by Bengt-Arne Wickström - 251-285 Strategy-proofness of a class of Borda rules
by Manimay Sen - 287-291 Multi-candidate equilibria
by Donald Wittman - 293-305 An impossibility theorem for spatial models
by Kim Border - 307-327 Electoral equilibria with restricted strategies
by Larry Samuelson - 329-343 Optimizing group judgmental accuracy in the presence of interdependencies
by Lloyd Shapley & Bernard Grofman
January 1984, Volume 43, Issue 2
- 113-149 Divergent evidence on free riding: An experimental examination of possible explanations
by R. Isaac & James Walker & Susan Thomas - 151-171 An examination of the factors affecting the formation of interest groups in OECD countries
by Peter Murrell - 173-186 Determinants of regulatory policies toward competition in the electric utility industry
by Walter Primeaux & John Filer & Robert Herren & Daniel Hollas - 187-194 Public opinion and regulatory behavior
by S. Anderson & A. Glazer - 195-202 Early projections and voter turnout in the 1980 presidential election
by John Carter - 203-209 Politicians and protection: Tariffs and elections in Australia
by John Conybeare - 211-215 On the mutuality of interest between bureaus and high demand review committees: The case of joint production
by Michael Munger - 217-223 Reviews
by Loren Lomasky & Robert McNown
January 1984, Volume 43, Issue 1
- 3-24 The free rider problem: Experimental evidence
by Oliver Kim & Mark Walker - 25-43 Public versus private economic activity: A new look at school bus transportation
by Robert McGuire & T. COTT - 45-64 Public protection against misperceived risks: Insights from positive political economy
by Mark Pauly & Howard Kunreuther & James Vaupel - 65-76 A theory of the bureaucratic value of Federal Reserve operating procedures
by Neil Skaggs - 77-82 Sequential referenda and bureaucratic man
by Kenneth Greene - 83-88 A note on centralized regulatory review
by James Miller & William Shughart & Robert Tollison - 89-94 Long-run equilibrium and total expenditures in rent-seeking
by William Corcoran - 95-97 Long-run equilibrium and total expenditures in rent-seeking: A comment
by Gordon Tullock - 99-100 The Electoral College and voter participation rates: A comment
by Anthony Ostrosky - 101-102 The Electoral College and voter participation rates: Reply
by Richard Cebula & Dennis Murphy - 103-112 Reviews
by Robert Tollison & William Mitchell & S. Roy
January 1984, Volume 42, Issue 3
- 225-234 Social choice and the status quo
by Jeffrey Richelson - 235-246 Arrow's theorem with social quasi-orderings
by John Weymark - 247-255 Utility function, group size, and the aggregate provision of a pure public good
by Koji Okuguchi - 257-272 Are qualified majority rules special?
by Shmuel Nitzan & Jacob Paroush - 273-285 The accuracy of group majority decisions in groups with added members
by Scott Feld & Bernard Grofman - 287-294 Maximizing models of legislative choice
by Ronald Warren - 295-310 Measuring state power in presidential elections
by Terrence Levesque - 311-325 To vote or not to vote: The paradox of nonvoting
by Guillermo Owen & Bernard Grofman
January 1984, Volume 42, Issue 2
- 113-131 Post election redistributive strategies of representatives: A partial theory of the politics of redistribution
by Norman Frohlich & Joe Oppenheimer - 133-145 Constitutional control of processes and their outcomes
by A. Hamlin - 147-160 Preference revelation and supply response in the arena of local government
by D. Kenyon - 161-174 Schumpeter and public choice, Part II Democracy and the demise of capitalism: The missing chapter in Schumpeter
by William Mitchell - 175-183 Public bureau budgets and jurisdiction size: An empirical note
by David Nellor - 185-192 Recurrent cost and performance comparisons within public administration: A method of generating efficiency-promoting competition
by Ernst Jonsson - 197-203 Is Tullock correct about Sunday closing laws?
by John Moorhouse - 205-211 Off-budget activities of local government: Comment
by Robert Blewett - 213-215 Off-budget activities of local government: Reply
by James Bennett & Thomas Dilorenzo - 217-224 Reviews
by Mark Toma & Martin Gaynor & Fred Glahe & John Goodman
January 1984, Volume 42, Issue 1
- 3-24 Demand-revealing processes and accounting standard-setting
by Steven Johnson - 25-37 Is there a relationship between economic conditions and political structure?
by David Laband - 39-54 Towards a neoaristotelean theory of politics: A positive account of ‘fairness’
by David Levy - 55-71 The social choice of alternative corrective devices
by Stuart Mestelman - 73-88 Schumpeter and public choice, Part I: Precursor to public choice?
by William Mitchell - 89-99 A (partial) rehabilitation of the public interest theory
by Gordon Tullock - 101-106 Socialism and the revenue maximizing Leviathan
by Adam Gifford & Roy Kenney - 107-112 Reviews
by John Stehle & Richard Bean
January 1983, Volume 41, Issue 3
- 351-369 Alternate rationales for severance pay compensation under airline deregulation
by Joseph Cordes & Robert Goldfarb - 371-386 From weakest-link to best-shot: The voluntary provision of public goods
by Jack Hirshleifer - 387-401 An experiment in the demand-revealing process
by T. Tideman - 403-418 Tests of a rational theory of the size of government
by Allan Meltzer & Scott Richard - 419-421 Further tests of a rational theory of the size of government
by Gordon Tullock - 423-426 Rejoinder to Gordon Tullock
by Allan Meltzer & Scott Richard - 427-434 Logrolling and high demand committee review
by Bruce Benson - 435-440 Privatization of public goods
by Robert Staaf - 441-448 Non-global social contracts: A note on inefficient social institutions
by Robert Blewett & Roger Congleton