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Manipulation and strategic voting in the Norwegian parliament

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  • Bjørn Rasch

Abstract

The Norwegian parliament uses a sequential voting procedure. After some general remarks on how the legislature can avoid strategic voting by choosing an appropriate voting order, and an exposition of the rules whereby the agenda is determined in this particular parliament, voting order manipulation is examined. A manipulative actor tries to bring about voting sequences in accordance with his interests, but contrary to the putative will of other actors. An example illustrates how manipulation may take place in practice, but it is stressed that the realm of manipulation easily escapes empirical analysis. To grasp the different types of manipulation in legislative voting, models are needed that are rich in institutional detail. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987

Suggested Citation

  • Bjørn Rasch, 1987. "Manipulation and strategic voting in the Norwegian parliament," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 52(1), pages 57-73, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:52:y:1987:i:1:p:57-73
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00116943
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. McKelvey, Richard D. & Niemi, Richard G., 1978. "A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-22, June.
    2. Richard Niemi, 1983. "Why so much stability?: Another opinion," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 261-270, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mogens Pedersen, 2014. "A Danish killer amendment—when judicial review was banned from the 1849 Constitution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 513-523, March.
    2. Bjørn Rasch, 2014. "Insincere voting under the successive procedure," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 499-511, March.
    3. Richard Niemi & Bjørn Rasch, 1987. "An extension of Black's theorem on voting orders to the successive procedure," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 187-190, January.

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