Reducing informational costs in endowment mechanisms
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References listed on IDEAS
- Andrew Postlewaite, 1979. "Manipulation via Endowments," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 255-262.
- Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, 1988. "Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(3), pages 693-700, May.
- Jordan, J. S., 1982. "The competitive allocation process is informationally efficient uniquely," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 1-18, October.
- Mount, Kenneth & Reiter, Stanley, 1974. "The informational size of message spaces," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 161-192, June.
- McKelvey, Richard D. & Niemi, Richard G., 1978. "A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-22, June.
- Trout Rader, 1963. "The Existence of a Utility Function to Represent Preferences," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 30(3), pages 229-232.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
- Celik, Gorkem, 2006.
"Mechanism design with weaker incentive compatibility constraints,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 37-44, July.
- Celik, Gorkem, 2004. "Mechanism Design with Weaker Incentive Compatibility Constraints," Microeconomics.ca working papers celik-04-09-13-05-50-40, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 06 Aug 2008.
- repec:dau:papers:123456789/166 is not listed on IDEAS
- Timothy Van Zandt, 1997. "Real-Time Hierarchical Resource Allocation," Discussion Papers 1231, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
More about this item
KeywordsEndowment mechanism; Message space; Nash implementation; Unanimity; Overstatement; C72; D70; D80;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
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