Mechanism Design with Weaker Incentive Compatibility Constraints
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- Celik, Gorkem, 2006. "Mechanism design with weaker incentive compatibility constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 37-44, July.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Alistair Munro, 2014. "Hide and Seek: A Theory of Efficient Income Hiding within the Household," GRIPS Discussion Papers 14-17, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies.
- Sher, Itai & Vohra, Rakesh, 2015. "Price discrimination through communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.
More about this item
KeywordsMechanism Design; Incentive Compatibility;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-09-30 (All new papers)
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