Evidence Arbitrage: The Fabrication of Evidence and the Verifiability of Contract Performance
Contract theory identifies verifiability as a critical determinant of the incompleteness of contracts. Although verifiability refers to the cost of proving relevant facts to a court, very little scholarship connects explicitly the evidentiary process to the drafting of substantive contract terms. This paper begins to explore this relationship to provide a more rigorous explanation of contract design. In particular, the paper concerns the very core of verifiability truth-finding by a court -- and examines the impact of the prospect of evidence fabrication on contracting. It thereby also explores the puzzling tolerance of the adjudicatory system for fabrication and the incentives to fabricate created by thresholds in burdens of proof. The paper suggests that, despite undermining truth finding, evidence fabrication may be harnessed by contracting parties to improve the (evidentiary) costefficiency of performance incentives in their relationship.We divide the future into evidentiary states. In each state, nature produces evidence of breach by the promisor; in the zero state, nature produces no evidence of breach. The probability of each positive state is greater if the promisor actually breaches (q) than if she performs (p). In each positive state, the prospect of damages liability has two effects: it induces the promisee to spend resources to present evidence (truthful or fabricated) to secure a damages award and it gives a performance incentive to the promisor (who wishes to reduce the probability of that state). At the time of contracting, the parties view these prospects in expected value terms: (i) the deterrence effect from the expected cost of breach and (ii) the expected evidentiary cost. The parties contracting objective is to maximize across states the performance incentive bang at lowest cost. They may arbitrage across states to get the largest incentive bang for their evidentiary buck: selecting for states with high incentive bang (high q-p) at low expected evidentiary cost (low q,p).As a particular instance of arbitrage, we show that when the likelihood ratio (q/p) increases as the evidentiary state becomes large, the parties may wish to induce less evidentiary presentment in low states and more in higher states. This may involve evidence fabrication at higher states once all the truthful evidence is presented. In this way, the parties engage in a joint, conscious contracting strategy to mislead the court in some future evidentiary states of the world.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Craswell, Richard & Calfee, John E, 1986. "Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 279-303, Fall.
- Daughety, Andrew F & Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1995.
"Product Safety: Liability, R&D, and Signaling,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1187-1206, December.
- Daughety, Andrew & Reinganum, Jennifer, 1992. "Product Safety: Liability, R & D and Signaling," Working Papers 94-17, University of Iowa, Department of Economics, revised 1994.
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1994. "Product Safety: Liability, R&D and Signaling," Game Theory and Information 9403007, EconWPA, revised 30 Mar 1994.
- Kaplow, Louis, 1994. "The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(1), pages 307-401, January.
- Jesse Bull, 2006.
"Costly Evidence Production and the Limits of Verifiability,"
0611, Florida International University, Department of Economics.
- Bull Jesse, 2008. "Costly Evidence Production and the Limits of Verifiability," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-28, July.
- Polinsky, A Mitchell & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1988. "The Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation for the Level of Liability," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(1), pages 151-64, January.
- Spier, Kathryn E, 1994. "Settlement Bargaining and the Design of Damage Awards," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 84-95, April.
- Schwartz, Alan, 1992. "Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 271-318, June.
- Green, Jerry R & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1986. "Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 447-56, July.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bep:upennl:upenn_wps-1005. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.