Evidence Arbitrage: The Fabrication of Evidence and the Verifiability of Contract Performance
Contract theory identifies verifiability as a critical determinant of the incompleteness of contracts. Although verifiability refers to the cost of proving relevant facts to a court, very little scholarship connects explicitly the evidentiary process to the drafting of substantive contract terms. This paper begins to explore this relationship to provide a more rigorous explanation of contract design. In particular, the paper concerns the very core of verifiability truth-finding by a court -- and examines the impact of the prospect of evidence fabrication on contracting. It thereby also explores the puzzling tolerance of the adjudicatory system for fabrication and the incentives to fabricate created by thresholds in burdens of proof. The paper suggests that, despite undermining truth finding, evidence fabrication may be harnessed by contracting parties to improve the (evidentiary) costefficiency of performance incentives in their relationship.We divide the future into evidentiary states. In each state, nature produces evidence of breach by the promisor; in the zero state, nature produces no evidence of breach. The probability of each positive state is greater if the promisor actually breaches (q) than if she performs (p). In each positive state, the prospect of damages liability has two effects: it induces the promisee to spend resources to present evidence (truthful or fabricated) to secure a damages award and it gives a performance incentive to the promisor (who wishes to reduce the probability of that state). At the time of contracting, the parties view these prospects in expected value terms: (i) the deterrence effect from the expected cost of breach and (ii) the expected evidentiary cost. The parties contracting objective is to maximize across states the performance incentive bang at lowest cost. They may arbitrage across states to get the largest incentive bang for their evidentiary buck: selecting for states with high incentive bang (high q-p) at low expected evidentiary cost (low q,p).As a particular instance of arbitrage, we show that when the likelihood ratio (q/p) increases as the evidentiary state becomes large, the parties may wish to induce less evidentiary presentment in low states and more in higher states. This may involve evidence fabrication at higher states once all the truthful evidence is presented. In this way, the parties engage in a joint, conscious contracting strategy to mislead the court in some future evidentiary states of the world.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Daughety, Andrew & Reinganum, Jennifer, 1992.
"Product Safety: Liability, R & D and Signaling,"
94-17, University of Iowa, Department of Economics, revised 1994.
- Craswell, Richard & Calfee, John E, 1986. "Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 279-303, Fall.
- Polinsky, A Mitchell & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1988. "The Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation for the Level of Liability," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(1), pages 151-64, January.
- Kaplow, Louis, 1994. "The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(1), pages 307-401, January.
- Spier, Kathryn E, 1994. "Settlement Bargaining and the Design of Damage Awards," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 84-95, April.
- repec:fiu:wpaper:0611 is not listed on IDEAS
- Schwartz, Alan, 1992. "Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 271-318, June.
- Green, Jerry R & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1986. "Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 447-56, July.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bep:upennl:upenn_wps-1005. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.