Nearsighted justice
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References listed on IDEAS
- Spier, Kathryn E, 1994. "Settlement Bargaining and the Design of Damage Awards," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 84-95, April.
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Cited by:
- Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 2008.
"Rules of proof, courts, and incentives,"
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- Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 2006. "Rules of Proof, Courts, and Incentives," Cahiers de recherche 0633, CIRPEE.
- Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 2007. "Rules of Proof, Courts, and Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series 2014, CESifo.
- Ronel Elul & Piero Gottardi, 2015.
"Bankruptcy: Is It Enough to Forgive or Must We Also Forget?,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 294-338, November.
- Piero Gottardi & Ronel Elul, 2007. "Bankruptcy: Is It Enough to Forgive or Must we Also Forget?," Working Papers 2007_23, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
- Ronel Elul & Piero Gottardi, 2008. "Bankruptcy: Is it enough to Forgive or must we also Forget?," CESifo Working Paper Series 2313, CESifo.
- Ronel Elul & Piero Gottardi, 2008. "Bankruptcy: Is It Enough to Forgive or Must We Also Forget?," Economics Working Papers ECO2008/41, European University Institute.
- Ronel Elul & Piero Gottardi, 2011. "Bankruptcy: is it enough to forgive or must we also forget?," Working Papers 11-14, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Ronel Elul & Piero Gottardi, 2007. "Bankruptcy: Is it enough to forgive or must we also forget?," Working Papers 07-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Franks, Julian R & Lóránth, Gyöngyi, 2005. "A Study of Inefficient Going Concerns in Bankruptcy," CEPR Discussion Papers 5035, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Nicola Gennaioli & Stefano Rossi, 2010.
"Judicial Discretion in Corporate Bankruptcy,"
Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(11), pages 4078-4114, November.
- Gennaioli, Nicola & Rossi, Stefano, 2008. "Judicial Discretion in Corporate Bankruptcy," CEI Working Paper Series 2008-5, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Sami, Hind, 2009.
"Random monitoring in financing relationships,"
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 239-252, May.
- Hind Sami, 2009. "Random monitoring in financing relationships," Post-Print halshs-00522629, HAL.
- Gennaioli, Nicola & Rossi, Stefano, 2008. "Optimal Resolutions of Financial Distress by Contract," CEI Working Paper Series 2008-6, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
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