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Judicial Discretion in Corporate Bankruptcy

Author

Listed:
  • Gennaioli, Nicola
  • Rossi, Stefano

Abstract

We study a demand and supply model of judicial discretion in corporate bankruptcy. On the supply side, we assume that bankruptcy courts may be biased for debtors or creditors, and subject to career concerns. On the demand side, we assume that debtors (and creditors) can engage in forum shopping at some cost. A key finding is that stronger creditor protection in reorganization improves judicial incentives to resolve financial distress efficiently, preventing a "race to the bottom" towards inefficient uses of judicial discretion. The comparative statics of our model shed light on a wealth of evidence on U.S. bankruptcy and yield novel predictions on how bankruptcy codes should affect firm-level outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Gennaioli, Nicola & Rossi, Stefano, 2008. "Judicial Discretion in Corporate Bankruptcy," CEI Working Paper Series 2008-5, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  • Handle: RePEc:hit:hitcei:2008-5
    Note: This version: December 2007
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    File URL: http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/rs/bitstream/10086/15739/1/WP2008-5a.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, 2008. "Judicial Fact Discretion," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(1), pages 1-35, January.
    2. Schwartz, Alan, 1997. "Contracting about Bankruptcy," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(1), pages 127-146, April.
    3. Dan Bernhardt & Ed Nosal, 2004. "Near-sighted Justice," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 59(6), pages 2655-2684, December.
    4. Julian R. Franks & Kjell G. Nyborg & Walter N. Torous, 1996. "A Comparison of UK, US and German Insolvency Codes," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 25(3), Fall.
    5. Kenneth Ayotte & Hayong Yun, "undated". "Matching Bankruptcy Laws to Legal Environments," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1018, American Law & Economics Association.
    6. Gilson, Stuart C. & John, Kose & Lang, Larry H. P., 1990. "Troubled debt restructurings*1: An empirical study of private reorganization of firms in default," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 315-353, October.
    7. Gennaioli, Nicola & Rossi, Stefano, 2008. "Optimal Resolutions of Financial Distress by Contract," CEI Working Paper Series 2008-6, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Nicola Gennaioli & Stefano Rossi, 2013. "Contractual Resolutions of Financial Distress," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 26(3), pages 602-634.
    2. Rodano, Giacomo & Serrano-Velarde, Nicolas & Tarantino, Emanuele, 2016. "Bankruptcy law and bank financing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 363-382.
    3. Tarantino, Emanuele, 2013. "Bankruptcy law and corporate investment decisions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(7), pages 2490-2500.
    4. Sreyan Chatterjee & Gausia Shaikh & Bhargavi Zaveri, 2017. "Watching India's Insolvency Reforms: A New Dataset of Insolvency Cases," Working Papers id:12105, eSocialSciences.
    5. Sreyan Chatterjee & Gausia Shaikh & Bhargavi Zaveri, 2017. "Watching India's insolvency reforms: A New dataset of insolvency cases," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2017-012, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
    6. Cesar Tamayo, 2015. "Investor protection and optimal contracts under risk aversion and costly state verification," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(3), pages 547-577, August.
    7. Pascal Fran├žois & Alon Raviv, 2014. "Heterogeneous Beliefs and the Choice Between Private Restructuring and Formal Bankruptcy," Cahiers de recherche 1401, CIRPEE.
    8. Meradj Mortezapouraghdam, 2016. "Three Essays on the Role of Frictions in the Economy," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/293qice3lj8, Sciences Po.
    9. Leyman, Bart & Schoors, Koen J.L. & Coussement, Peter, 2011. "Does court-supervised reorganization work? Evidence from post-confirmation firm failure," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 149-168, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Judicial Discretion; Corporate Bankruptcy;

    JEL classification:

    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law

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