Judicial Discretion in Corporate Bankruptcy
We study a demand and supply model of judicial discretion in corporate bankruptcy. On the supply side, we assume that bankruptcy courts may be biased for debtors or creditors, and subject to career concerns. On the demand side, we assume that debtors (and creditors) can engage in forum shopping at some cost. A key finding is that stronger creditor protection in reorganization improves judicial incentives to resolve financial distress efficiently, preventing a "race to the bottom" towards inefficient uses of judicial discretion. The comparative statics of our model shed light on a wealth of evidence on U.S. bankruptcy and yield novel predictions on how bankruptcy codes should affect firm-level outcomes.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2008|
|Note:||This version: December 2007|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 2-1 Naka, Kunitachi, Tokyo 186-8603|
Web page: http://cei.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Dan Bernhardt & Ed Nosal, 2004.
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- Gennaioli, Nicola & Shleifer, Andrei, 2008. "Judicial Fact Discretion," Scholarly Articles 3451304, Harvard University Department of Economics.
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- Gilson, Stuart C. & John, Kose & Lang, Larry H. P., 1990. "Troubled debt restructurings*1: An empirical study of private reorganization of firms in default," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 315-353, October.
- Gennaioli, Nicola & Rossi, Stefano, 2008. "Optimal Resolutions of Financial Distress by Contract," CEI Working Paper Series 2008-6, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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