The Resolution of Financial Distress
Most models of financial structure embody an assumption about financial distress that causes debt to be costly to the issuing firm. This approach has been criticized on the grounds that the assumed costs could be avoided by a costless financial reorganization. In this article we show that despite the possibility of costless reorganization, it may be rational for firms to incur significant costs in the resolution of financial distress. The main assumptions that give rise to our results are the existence of asymmetric courts to impose a reorganization on the claimants of a firm. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.
Volume (Year): 2 (1989)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Oxford University Press, Journals Department, 2001 Evans Road, Cary, NC 27513 USA.|
Web page: https://academic.oup.com/rfs
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www4.oup.co.uk/revfin/subinfo/|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:2:y:1989:i:1:p:25-47. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.