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Agency Conflicts Around the World

Author

Listed:
  • Erwan Morellec

    (EPFL and Swiss Finance Institute)

  • Boris Nikolov

    (EPFL, University of Lausanne and Swiss Finance Institute)

  • Norman Schürhoff

    (EPFL, University of Lausanne and Swiss Finance Institute)

Abstract

We use a dynamic model of financing decisions to quantify agency conflicts across legal and institutional environments and decompose their effects into wealth transfers among stakeholders and value losses from policy distortions. Our estimates show that agency costs are large and vary widely across and within countries. Legal origin and provisions for investor protection affect agency costs, but they are more relevant for curtailing governance excesses than guarding the typical firm. Agency costs split about equally into wealth transfers and value losses from policy distortions, the latter being larger where ownership is dispersed. Incentive misalignment captures 60% of country variation in leverage.

Suggested Citation

  • Erwan Morellec & Boris Nikolov & Norman Schürhoff, 2015. "Agency Conflicts Around the World," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 15-21, Swiss Finance Institute, revised Apr 2016.
    • Handle: RePEc:chf:rpseri:rp1521
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    File URL: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2630018
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    Cited by:

    1. Ener, Hakan & Dávila, Antonio, 2023. "What makes search fund entrepreneurship different in Europe?," European Management Journal, Elsevier, vol. 41(4), pages 488-498.
    2. Wei Zhang & Xiong Xiong & Guanying Wang & Jing Li, 2022. "The accounting and trading information channels of excess control rights on IPO long-term return in China," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 59(4), pages 1609-1646, November.
    3. de La Bruslerie, Hubert & Gueguen, Simon, 2021. "Creditors’ holdup, releveraging and the setting of private appropriation in a control contract between shareholders," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    4. Antill, Samuel & Grenadier, Steven R., 2019. "Optimal capital structure and bankruptcy choice: Dynamic bargaining versus liquidation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 198-224.
    5. Hajda, Jakub & Nikolov, Boris, 2022. "Product market strategy and corporate policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(3), pages 932-964.
    6. Nikolov, Boris & Schmid, Lukas & Steri, Roberto, 2021. "The Sources of Financing Constraints," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(2), pages 478-501.
    7. Liu, Yongda & Padgett, Carol & Yin, Chao, 2022. "Internal information quality and financial policy peer effects," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    8. Jiao, Feng & Zhang, Chuanqian, 2022. "Lumpy investment and credit risk," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    9. Gan, Liu & Xia, Xin & Chen, Yifei, 2018. "Investment and financing choices by time-inconsistent managers," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 29-48.
    10. Ataullah, Ali & Le, Hang & Wang, Zilong & Wood, Geoffrey, 2022. "Corporate diversification and downsizing decisions: International evidence from sharp and sudden performance shocks," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
    11. Anshu Agrawal, 2020. "Modified Total Interpretive Structural Model of Corporate Financial Flexibility," Global Journal of Flexible Systems Management, Springer;Global Institute of Flexible Systems Management, vol. 21(4), pages 369-388, December.
    12. Huang, Fumian & Ge, Liming & Wu, Sirui, 2023. "Minority shareholder protection, corporate governance, and investment efficiency," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(PC).
    13. Nikolov, Boris & Schmid, Lukas & Steri, Roberto, 2019. "Dynamic corporate liquidity," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 76-102.
    14. Kałdoński, Michał & Jewartowski, Tomasz, 2025. "Are institutional investors effective monitors in a country where closely held firms predominate? Insights from agency problem-driven dividend payouts," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 77(PB).

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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