IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/umedbu/7478.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Mutual knowledge structures and social coordination: a knowledge-induced equilibrium

Author

Listed:
  • Richards, Diana

Abstract

Shared knowledge structures, such as cognitive categories and relationships, are central to the interpretation of a complex social environment and thus play an important role in mediating between individual preferences and group outcomes. This article defines a "knowledge-induced equilibrium" that applies to both cooperative game theory, such as social choice and voting, and to non-cooperative game theory, such as coordination games. This equilibrium concept bridges between interpretive approaches, which emphasize cognitive structures or frames, and positive approaches, which focus on preferences, choice, and the stability of collective outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Richards, Diana, 1998. "Mutual knowledge structures and social coordination: a knowledge-induced equilibrium," Bulletins 7478, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:umedbu:7478
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.7478
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/7478/files/bu980002.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.22004/ag.econ.7478?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey S., 1996. "Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 90(1), pages 34-45, March.
    2. Diana Richards & Brendan D. McKay & Whitman A. Richards, 1998. "Collective Choice and Mutual Knowledge Structures," Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 1(02n03), pages 221-236.
    3. Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast, 1981. "Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 503-519, January.
    4. Lupia,Arthur & McCubbins,Mathew D., 1998. "The Democratic Dilemma," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521584487.
    5. Lupia,Arthur & McCubbins,Mathew D., 1998. "The Democratic Dilemma," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521585934.
    6. Wendt, Alexander, 1992. "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 391-425, April.
    7. Arthur T. Denzau & Douglass C. North, 1994. "Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1), pages 3-31, February.
    8. Michael Taylor, 1968. "Graph-theoretic approaches to the theory of social choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 35-47, March.
    9. Norman Schofield, 1983. "Generic Instability of Majority Rule," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 50(4), pages 695-705.
    10. McLennan, Andrew, 1998. "Consequences of the Condorcet Jury Theorem for Beneficial Information Aggregation by Rational Agents," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(2), pages 413-418, June.
    11. McKelvey, Richard D. & Niemi, Richard G., 1978. "A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-22, June.
    12. Barbera Salvador & Gul Faruk & Stacchetti Ennio, 1993. "Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 262-289, December.
    13. Jones, Bradford & Radcliff, Benjamin & Taber, Charles & Timpone, Richard, 1995. "Condorcet Winners and the Paradox of Voting: Probability Calculations for Weak Preference Orders," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(1), pages 137-144, March.
    14. McKelvey, Richard D., 1976. "Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 472-482, June.
    15. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    16. Nicholas G. Polson & George C. Tiao (ed.), 1995. "Bayesian Inference," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, volume 0, number 602.
    17. Diana Richards & Whitman A. Richards & Brendan D. McKay, 1998. "Collective Choice and Mutual Knowledge Structures," Research in Economics 98-04-032e, Santa Fe Institute.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Schnakenberg, Keith E., 2015. "Expert advice to a voting body," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 102-113.
    2. Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2020. "Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(2), pages 237-258, March.
    3. Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2014. "Empirical social choice: an introduction," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 297-310, March.
    4. Xosé Carlos Arias & Gonzalo Caballero, 2003. "Instituciones, costos de transacción y políticas públicas: un panorama," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 5(8), pages 117-146, January-J.
    5. Mat McCubbins & Roger Noll & Barry Weingast, 2005. "The Political Economy of Law: Decision-Making by Judicial, Legislative, Executive and Administrative Agencies," Discussion Papers 04-035, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    6. John R. Freeman & Jude C. Hays & Helmut Stix, 1999. "Democracy and Markets: The Case of Exchange Rates," Working Papers 39, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank).
    7. Schnellenbach, Jan & Schubert, Christian, 2015. "Behavioral political economy: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 395-417.
    8. Roger Congleton, 2007. "Informational limits to democratic public policy: The jury theorem, yardstick competition, and ignorance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 333-352, September.
    9. Richard Carson & Nicholas Flores & Norman Meade, 2001. "Contingent Valuation: Controversies and Evidence," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 19(2), pages 173-210, June.
    10. Norman Schofield, 2015. "Climate Change, Collapse and Social Choice Theory," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 9(1), pages 007-035, October.
    11. P. Hägg, 1997. "Theories on the Economics of Regulation: A Survey of the Literature from a European Perspective," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 337-370, December.
    12. Valentino Larcinese, 2009. "Information Acquisition, Ideology and Turnout: Theory and Evidence From Britain," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 21(2), pages 237-276, April.
    13. Thomas R. Palfrey, 2005. "Laboratory Experiments in Political Economy," Working Papers 91, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    14. Rui J. P. de Figueiredo Jr. & Jack Rakove & Barry R. Weingast, 2006. "Rationality, Inaccurate Mental Models, and Self-confirming Equilibrium," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 18(4), pages 384-415, October.
    15. Scott E. Page, 2008. "Uncertainty, Difficulty, and Complexity," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 20(2), pages 115-149, April.
    16. repec:pri:cepsud:111palfrey is not listed on IDEAS
    17. David Lake, 2007. "Delegating divisible sovereignty: Sweeping a conceptual minefield," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 219-237, September.
    18. Knudson, Mathew, 2020. "Two candidate competition on differentiated policy sets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 413-434.
    19. Saori CHIBA, 2018. "Hidden Profiles and Persuasion Cascades in Group Decision-Making," Discussion papers e-18-001, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.
    20. Thomas R. Palfrey, 2005. "Laboratory Experiments in Political Economy," Working Papers 91, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    21. Adrian Deemen, 2014. "On the empirical relevance of Condorcet’s paradox," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 311-330, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political Economy;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:umedbu:7478. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: AgEcon Search (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/dcumnus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.