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On the theory of political competition: Comparative statics from a general allocative perspective

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  • Paul Johnson

Abstract

It is a widely held belief that interest groups respond competitively to political challenges from other groups. This view is found not only in the traditional theory of interest groups, but also in the literature on policy typologies. Though it is not necessarily supposed that groups form in response to opposition, it is believed that when groups exist, they compete. If an interest group is thought of as a multipurpose organization, whose leaders might spend organizational funds on nonpolitical programs which directly serve the members, the supposition of competition can be subjected to rigorous examination. Political competition causes the cost of political success to rise. Since group leaders must allocate scarce revenue among projects, it seems that nonpolitical projects might become more attractive when the political environment becomes competitive. Political scientists have usually been disposed to take the opposite view, believing that demand for political activity rises as the cost of political success increases. The nature of political action as an organizational investment is discussed from the allocative perspective in this essay. It is shown that competition cannot be safely assumed unless other strong hypotheses are invoked. A Slutsky-type theorem is deduced for political reaction. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1988

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Johnson, 1988. "On the theory of political competition: Comparative statics from a general allocative perspective," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 58(3), pages 217-235, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:58:y:1988:i:3:p:217-235
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00155668
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
    2. repec:bla:econom:v:48:y:1981:i:190:p:143-53 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Salisbury, Robert H., 1984. "Interest Representation: The Dominance of Institutions," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 78(1), pages 64-76, March.
    4. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
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    Cited by:

    1. John K. Wilson & Richard Damania, 2003. "Corruption, Political Competition and Environmental Policy," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2003-09, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.

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