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A median-voter model of economic regulation

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  • Burton Abrams
  • Kenneth Lewis

Abstract

A basic median-voter model is developed and extended to analyze issues of economic regulation and public policy outcomes. The model is used to generate comparative static results relating changes in public-policy outcomes to changes in relative group sizes, total population, information costs, and population heterogeneity. The model is also used to explore the issue of optimal group size — the size of the special-interest group that maximizes the group's per capita public policy gains. Comparative static analysis reveals how optimal group size and gains per capita are affected by changes in population heterogeneity, the size of the total population, and relative knowledge levels. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987

Suggested Citation

  • Burton Abrams & Kenneth Lewis, 1987. "A median-voter model of economic regulation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 52(2), pages 125-142, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:52:y:1987:i:2:p:125-142
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00123873
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Borcherding, Thomas E & Deacon, Robert T, 1972. "The Demand for the Services of Non-Federal Governments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 891-901, December.
    2. Hinich, Melvin J., 1977. "Equilibrium in spatial voting: The median voter result is an artifact," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 208-219, December.
    3. Melvin Hinich & Peter Ordeshook, 1969. "Abstentions and equilibrium in the electoral process," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 81-106, September.
    4. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
    5. Abrams, Burton A & Settle, Russell F, 1978. "The Economic Theory of Regulation and Public Financing of Presidential Elections," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(2), pages 245-257, April.
    6. A. Smithies, 1941. "Optimum Location in Spatial Competition," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 49, pages 423-423.
    7. Lovell, Michael C, 1978. "Spending for Education: The Exercise of Public Choice," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 60(4), pages 487-495, November.
    8. Abrams, Burton A. & Lewis, Kenneth A., 1987. "The effect of information costs on regulatory outcomes," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 159-170, May.
    9. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
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    1. Julián Costas-Fernández & Simón Lodato, 2022. "Inequality, poverty and the composition of redistribution," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(4), pages 925-967, November.

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