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Laissez-faire in campaign finance

Author

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  • W. Crain
  • Robert Tollison
  • Donald Leavens

Abstract

In this paper we analyze the impact of campaign contribution limits on government expenditures. The theory is based on the proclivity of geographic-based legislators to support wealth transfers from the polity at large to finance benefits for local constituents. It predicts that laissez-faire in contributions will lead to less government spending on budgetary redistribution and to a greater output of laws by the legislature. The theory is tested using data on U.S. State governments. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1988

Suggested Citation

  • W. Crain & Robert Tollison & Donald Leavens, 1988. "Laissez-faire in campaign finance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 56(3), pages 201-212, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:56:y:1988:i:3:p:201-212
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00130271
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Maloney, Michael T & McCormick, Robert E & Tollison, Robert D, 1984. "Economic Regulation, Competitive Governments, and Specialized Resources," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(2), pages 329-338, October.
    2. Easterbrook, Frank H, 1983. "Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(1), pages 23-50, April.
    3. Peltzman, Sam, 1984. "Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(1), pages 181-210, April.
    4. Gary Jacobson, 1985. "Money and votes reconsidered: congressional elections, 1972–1982," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 47(1), pages 7-62, January.
    5. Jacobson, Gary C., 1978. "The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 72(2), pages 469-491, June.
    6. W. Welch, 1981. "Money and votes: A simultaneous equation model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 209-234, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Filip Palda, 2002. "Campaign Finance: An Introduction to the Field," Public Economics 0209005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/fvtnkmt15tlkfv89pa905292g is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Martial Foucault & Abel François, 2005. "Le rendement des dépenses électorales en France," Post-Print hal-03459034, HAL.
    4. Martial Foucault & Abel François, 2005. "Le rendement des dépenses électorales en France. Le cas des élections législatives de 1997," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 56(5), pages 1125-1143.

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