Efficient rents 2 free entry and efficient rent seeking
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1007/BF00124422
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Gordon Tullock, 1984. "Long-run equilibrium and total expenditures in rent-seeking: A comment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 95-97, January.
- Hillman, Arye L & Katz, Eliakim, 1984. "Risk-Averse Rent Seekers and the Social Cost of Monopoly Power," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(373), pages 104-110, March.
- William S. Comanor & Robert H. Smiley, 1975. "Monopoly and the Distribution of Wealth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 89(2), pages 177-194.
- Posner, Richard A, 1975.
"The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 807-827, August.
- Richard A. Posner, 1974. "Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," NBER Working Papers 0055, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
- William Corcoran, 1984. "Long-run equilibrium and total expenditures in rent-seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 89-94, January.
- William P. Rogerson, 1982. "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 391-401, Autumn.
- Barry J. Nalebuff & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1983. "Prices and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(1), pages 21-43, Spring.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- James Lake & Maia Linask, 2015.
"Costly distribution and the non-equivalence of tariffs and quotas,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 165(3), pages 211-238, December.
- James Lake & Maia K. Linask, 2015. "Costly distribution and the non-equivalence of tariffs and quotas," Departmental Working Papers 1509, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics.
- Thomas Giebe & Paul Schweinzer, 2014.
"All-pay-all aspects of political decision making,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 161(1), pages 73-90, October.
- Thomas Giebe & Paul Schweinzer, "undated". "All-pay aspects of decision making under public scrutiny," Discussion Papers 11/27, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Thomas Giebe & Paul Schweinzer, 2013. "All-pay-all Aspects of Political Decision Making," CESifo Working Paper Series 4330, CESifo.
- Michael A. Brooks & Ben J. Heudra, 1989. "An Exploration of Rent Seeking," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 65(1), pages 32-50, March.
- Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1989.
"Politically Contestable Rents And Transfers,"
Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, March.
- Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1987. "Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers," UCLA Economics Working Papers 452, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Jingfeng Lu & Hongkun Ma & Zhe Wang, 2018. "Ranking Disclosure Policies In All‐Pay Auctions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(3), pages 1464-1485, July.
- Chiappinelli, Olga, 2014. "An elimination contest with non-sunk bids," MPRA Paper 56140, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Nitzan, Shmuel, 1991. "Collective Rent Dissipation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(409), pages 1522-1534, November.
- Jiao, Qian & Ke, Changxia & Liu, Yang, 2022. "When to disclose the number of contestants: Theory and experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 193(C), pages 146-160.
- Luke Boosey & Philip Brookins & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2020. "Information Disclosure in Contests with Endogenous Entry: An Experiment," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(11), pages 5128-5150, November.
- Francesco Parisi & Barbara Luppi & Alice Guerra, 2017. "Gordon Tullock and the Virginia School of Law and Economics," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 48-61, March.
- Paan Jindapon & Christopher Whaley, 2015. "Risk lovers and the rent over-investment puzzle," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(1), pages 87-101, July.
- David N. Laband & John P. Sophocleus, 2019. "Measuring rent-seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(1), pages 49-69, October.
- James Lake & Maia K. Linask, 2013. "The near-equivalence of tariffs and quotas," Departmental Working Papers 1305, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics.
- Nava Kahana & Doron Klunover, 2015. "A note on Poisson contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 165(1), pages 97-102, October.
- Adarkwah Yaw Antwi & John Adams, 2003. "Rent-seeking Behaviour and its Economic Costs in Urban Land Transactions in Accra, Ghana," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 40(10), pages 2083-2098, September.
- Luke Boosey & Philip Brookins & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2020. "Entry in group contests," Working Papers wp2020_02_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
- Dmitry Ryvkin, 2013.
"Contests With Doping,"
Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 14(3), pages 253-275, June.
- Dmitry Ryvkin, 2009. "Contests with doping," Working Papers wp2009_06_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
- Min Jeong Park, 2007. "Rent Seeking in Korean Government Budget Allocation," International Review of Public Administration, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(2), pages 33-44, January.
- Liu, Bin & Lu, Jingfeng, 2023. "Optimal orchestration of rewards and punishments in rank-order contests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
- Dennis C. Mueller, 2016. "Gordon Tullock: economic gadfly," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 112-123, June.
- Liu, Bin & Lu, Jingfeng, 2019. "The optimal allocation of prizes in contests with costly entry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 137-161.
- Mark Fey, 2008. "Rent-seeking contests with incomplete information," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 135(3), pages 225-236, June.
- William F. Shughart, 2017. "A Personal Remembrance," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 83(3), pages 630-636, January.
- Robert Ritz, 2008. "Influencing rent-seeking contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 135(3), pages 291-300, June.
- Jia, Hao & Sun, Ching-jen, 2021. "The optimal entry fee-prize ratio in Tullock contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Arye Hillman & Dov Samet, 1987. "Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 63-82, January.
- Xiuqin Yang & Feng Liu & Hua Wang, 2023. "Complex Dynamic Analysis for a Rent-Seeking Game with Political Competition and Policymaker Costs," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(21), pages 1-18, November.
- Temel, Tugrul, 2011. "Industrial policy, collective action, and the direction of technological change," MPRA Paper 31917, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Robert Michaels, 1988. "The design of rent-seeking competitions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 17-29, January.
- Elie Appelbaum & Eliakim Katz, 1986.
"Transfer seeking and avoidance: On the full social costs of rent seeking,"
Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 391-397,
Springer.
- Elie Appelbaum & Eliakim Katz, 1986. "Transfer seeking and avoidance: On the full social costs of rent seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 175-181, January.
- Elie Appelbaum & Eliakim Katz, 1996. "Transfer seeking and avoidance: On the full social costs of rent seeking," Working Papers 1996_11, York University, Department of Economics.
- Edward Millner & Michael Pratt, 1989. "An experimental investigation of efficient rent-seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 62(2), pages 139-151, August.
- Coggins, Jay S., 1992. "Rent Dissipation and the Social Cost of Price Policy," Staff Papers 200551, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics.
- Mahmudul Anam & Eliakim Katz, 1988. "Rent-seeking and second best economics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(3), pages 215-224, December.
- J. Smith & Shlomo Weber, 1989. "Rent-seeking behaviour of retaliating agents," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(2), pages 153-166, May.
- Coggins, Jay S., 1992. "Rent Dissipation And The Social Cost Of Price Policy," 1992 Annual Meeting, August 9-12, Baltimore, Maryland 271378, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
- Mantell, Edmund H., 1996. "The social costs of monopoly and regulation: Posner reconsidered again," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 249-268.
- Antoine Gentier & Giusepina Gianfreda & Nathalie Janson, 2011.
"Rent dissipation or government predation ? The notes issuance activity in Italy 1865-1882,"
Post-Print
hal-00735325, HAL.
- Antoine Gentier & Giuseppina Gianfreda & Nathalie Janson, 2011. "Rent Dissipation or Government Predation? The Notes Issuance Activity in Italy 1865-1882," CAE Working Papers 88, Aix-Marseille Université, CERGAM.
- James Lake & Maia Linask, 2015.
"Costly distribution and the non-equivalence of tariffs and quotas,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 165(3), pages 211-238, December.
- James Lake & Maia K. Linask, 2015. "Costly distribution and the non-equivalence of tariffs and quotas," Departmental Working Papers 1509, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics.
- Douglas Davis & Robert Reilly, 1998.
"Do too many cooks always spoil the stew? An experimental analysis of rent-seeking and the role of a strategic buyer,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 89-115, April.
- Davis, Douglas D & Reilly, Robert J, 1998. "Do Too Many Cooks Always Spoil the Stew? An Experimental Analysis of Rent-Seeking and the Role of a Strategic Buyer," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1-2), pages 89-115, April.
- Arye L. Hillman & Heinrich W. Ursprung, 2016.
"Where are the rent seekers?,"
Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 124-141, June.
- Arye L. Hillman & Heinrich Ursprung, 2016. "Where are the Rent Seekers?," CESifo Working Paper Series 5833, CESifo.
- Raouf Boucekkine & Fabien Prieur & Benteng Zou, 2015. "Institutional dynamics under revenue volatility and revenue-dependent lobbying power: A stochastic differential game approach," DEM Discussion Paper Series 15-08, Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg.
- Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1989.
"Politically Contestable Rents And Transfers,"
Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, March.
- Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1987. "Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers," UCLA Economics Working Papers 452, UCLA Department of Economics.
- William Corcoran & Gordon Karels, 1985. "Efficient rents 1 rent-seeking behavior in the long-run," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(3), pages 227-246, January.
- Raouf Boucekkine & Fabien Prieur & Benteng Zou, 2015.
"Symmetric vs Asymmetric Equilibria and Stochastic Stability in a Dynamic Game of Legislative Lobbying,"
AMSE Working Papers
1531, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, revised Jan 2018.
- Raouf Boucekkine & Fabien Prieur & Benteng Zou, 2018. "Symmetric vs Asymmetric Equilibria and Stochastic Stability in a Dynamic Game of Legislative Lobbying," Working Papers halshs-01181214, HAL.
- Raouf Boucekkine & Fabien Prieur & Benteng Zou, 2018. "Symmetric vs asymmetric equilibria and stochastic stability in a dynamic game of legislative lobbying," DEM Discussion Paper Series 18-03, Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg.
- Jay S. Coggins, 1995. "Rent Dissipation And The Social Cost Of Price Policy," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(2), pages 147-166, July.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:46:y:1985:i:3:p:247-258. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.