The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
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- Usman Qadir, 2016. "Technology Acquisition, Catching Up and Competitiveness in Pakistan," PIDE-Working Papers 2016:134, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics.
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- Kyung Hwan Baik, 1994. "Winner-Help-Loser Group Formation In Rent-Seeking Contests," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(2), pages 147-162, July.
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- Will, Matthias Georg, 2012. "Change Management und Interaktionspotentiale: Wie Rationalfallen den organisatorischen Wandel blockieren," Discussion Papers 2012-9, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
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