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Successful organizational change through win-win: How change managers can organize mutual benefits

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  • Will, Matthias Georg

Abstract

The situational logic of multi-sided dilemmas often inhibits organizational change. This article develops a heuristic that can support change managers in distinguishing between optimization of moves within a game and adjustment of formal and informal governance structures of the game. This heuristic illustrates how change managers can create mutual benefits through incentives or commitment mechanisms and thus reduce resistance to organizational change. The link between governance structures and individual behavior reveals the extent to which a change management focusing on action theory can be integrated into existing governance structures or, alternatively, to what degree governance structures will have to change to create win-win potentials.

Suggested Citation

  • Will, Matthias Georg, 2012. "Successful organizational change through win-win: How change managers can organize mutual benefits," Discussion Papers 2012-20, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:mlucee:201220
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