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Change Management und Interaktionspotentiale: Wie Rationalfallen den organisatorischen Wandel blockieren

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  • Will, Matthias Georg

Abstract

Die Situationslogik mehrseitiger Dilemmata blockiert häufig den organisatorischen Wandlungsprozess. Dieser Beitrag entwickelt eine Heuristik, wie Change Manager zwischen einem Optimierungsbedarf auf der Ebene der Spielzüge und einem Anpassungsbedarf auf der Ebene der Spielregeln unterscheiden können. Hierauf aufbauend wird gezeigt, inwieweit ein handlungstheoretisch konzipierter Wandlungsprozess mit den bestehenden Institutionen im Unternehmen anreizkompatibel ist, oder inwieweit die Spielregeln für einen erfolgreichen organisatorischen Wandel geändert werden müssen. Change Manager müssen hierfür differenzieren, inwieweit kooperative Teamprozesse oder kompetitive Tournaments die wechselseitigen Interaktionspotentiale optimal nut-en können und inwieweit sich das Change Management in diese Spiele integrieren lässt. Der Beitrag zeigt, wie mit (immateriellen) Bonus- oder Malus-Systemen eine Integration des organisatorischen Wandels gelingen kann. Die beiden Anreizmechanismen sind abhängig von der jeweiligen Problemstellung unterschiedlich gut geeignet, die Spielregeln an den Wandel anzupassen. Für einen erfolgreichen Wandel müssen Change Manager zusätzlich beachten, wer glaubhafte Anreizmechanismen anbieten kann und welche Kosten damit verbunden sind.

Suggested Citation

  • Will, Matthias Georg, 2012. "Change Management und Interaktionspotentiale: Wie Rationalfallen den organisatorischen Wandel blockieren," Discussion Papers 2012-9, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:mlucee:20129
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    1. Will, Matthias Georg, 2012. "Erfolgreicher organisatorischer Wandel durch die Überwindung von Risiken: Eine interaktionstheoretische Perspektive," Discussion Papers 2012-19, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
    2. Will, Matthias Georg, 2012. "Der blinde Fleck der Change-Management-Literatur: Wie Hold-Up-Probleme den organisatorischen Wandlungsprozess blockieren können," Discussion Papers 2012-10, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.

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