On the Notion of Responsibility in Organizations
We derive a natural definition of responsibility in a formal model in which employees care for their career prospects: A superior holds a subordinate responsible for a task when she announces her belief that this subordinate contributes most to this task . We show that those announced beliefs lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy, as the reputation of the responsible subordinate is then affected by the outcome of the task and he therefore has strong incentives to contribute to its success. There are equilibria in which either a single agent or no agent is responsible for a task but joint responsibility never arises. Several extensions are discussed. Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.
Volume (Year): 22 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK|
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://jleo.oupjournals.org/
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.oup.co.uk/journals|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mathias Dewatripont & Ian Jewitt & Jean Tirole, 1999.
"The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 183-198.
- Mathias Dewatripont & Ian Jewitt & Jean Tirole, 1999. "The economics of career concerns: part 1 :comparing information structures," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9617, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Guasch, J Luis, 1988. "Heterogeneity, Tournaments, and Hierarchies," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(4), pages 867-81, August.
- Manove, Michael, 1997. "Job Responsibility, Pay and Promotion," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(440), pages 85-103, January.
- Dirk Sliwka, 2001.
"On the Costs and Benefits of Delegation in Organizations,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE),
Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 157(4), pages 568-, December.
- Sliwka, Dirk, 1999. "On the Costs and Benefits of Delegation in Organizations," Discussion Paper Serie A 600, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Baker, George & Gibbons, Robert & Murphy, Kevin J, 1999. "Informal Authority in Organizations," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 56-73, April.
- Lazear, Edward P, 1989. "Pay Equality and Industrial Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(3), pages 561-80, June.
- Green, Jerry & Stokey, Nancy, 1983.
"A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts,"
3203644, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Meyer, M.A., 1991.
"The Dynamics of Learning with Team Production: Implications for Task Assignment,"
30, Stanford - Institute for Thoretical Economics.
- Margaret A. Meyer, 1994. "The Dynamics of Learning with Team Production: Implications for Task Assignment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 109(4), pages 1157-1184.
- Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, 1979.
"Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts,"
NBER Working Papers
0401, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Waldman, Michael, 1990.
"Up-or-Out Contracts: A Signaling Perspective,"
Journal of Labor Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 8(2), pages 230-50, April.
- Prendergast, Canice J, 1995. "A Theory of Responsibility in Organizations," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(3), pages 387-400, July.
- Fairburn, James A. & Malcomson, James M., 1994.
"Rewarding performance by promotion to a different job,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 683-690, April.
- Fairburn, J.A. & Malcomson, J.M., 1993. "Rewarding performance by promotion to a different job," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9316, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:22:y:2006:i:2:p:523-547. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.