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Rent-seeking, distributional coalitions, taxes, relative prices and economic growth


  • Richard Vedder
  • Lowell Gallaway


The results clearly indicate that much of the considerable variation in the pace and pattern of economic growth between the various American states is explainable by institutional arrangements amenable to revisions through public policy. The findings suggest that long run economic growth would be best served by constraining distributional coalitions, be it through constitutional restraints (e.g., balanced budget amendments, the item veto), statutory changes (e.g., subjecting coalitions like labor unions to the antitrust laws), or some other means (e.g., labor and capital fleeing distributional coalitions, such as in the movement of workers and plants to nonunion areas). Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1986

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Vedder & Lowell Gallaway, 1986. "Rent-seeking, distributional coalitions, taxes, relative prices and economic growth," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 93-100, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:51:y:1986:i:1:p:93-100
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00141689

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    Cited by:

    1. Richard Vedder & Lowell Gallaway & David Sollars, 1988. "The Tullock-Bastiat hypothesis, inequality-transfer curve and the natural distribution of income," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 56(3), pages 285-294, March.
    2. Cole, Ismail M., 2014. "Short- and long-term growth effects of special interest groups in the U.S. states: A dynamic panel error-correction approach," MPRA Paper 54455, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 02 Mar 2014.
    3. Daniel L. Bennet, 2016. "Subnational Economic Freedom and Performance in the United States and Canada," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 36(1), pages 165-185, Winter.

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