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The power of the chairman

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  • Richard Niemi
  • Bo Bjurulf
  • Gordon Blewis

Abstract

Our results here demonstrate rather convincingly what our intuition tells us is correct. A chairman with a regular and tie-breaking vote is more likely to get his first choice than is a person with only a regular vote, and a person with a regular vote is more likely to get his way than is a chairman with only a tiebreaking vote. In addition, if ties occur, a non-member who is chairman is more likely to get his first choice than is a regular member. These results hold for sincere and sophisticated voting and for the successive and amendment procedures. They hold — only more so — if the chairman controls the agenda. At least for these binary procedures, Farquharson's conclusion should have been: Seek a tie-breaking vote if you do not have to give up a regular vote to obtain it; shun the power to break ties if it means giving up a regular vote. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1983

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Niemi & Bo Bjurulf & Gordon Blewis, 1983. "The power of the chairman," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 293-305, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:40:y:1983:i:3:p:293-305
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00114525
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. McKelvey, Richard D. & Niemi, Richard G., 1978. "A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-22, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. M. Braham & F. Steffen, 2007. "The Chairman’s Paradox Revisited," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(2), pages 231-253, February.
    2. Richard Niemi, 1983. "An exegesis of Farquharson's Theory of Voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 323-328, January.

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