Multi-Stage Voting and Sequential Elimination with Productive Players
This paper analyzes a sequential voting mechanism that eliminates at each round one candidate, until only one of them is left (the winner). The candidates are the voters and they only differ across their skill level. The payoff allocated to the winner depends on the sequence of elimination of the players’ skills, the rest of the players receiving a payoff of zero. We fully characterize the equilibria of the game with two skills. The winner must be a high-skilled player if there is an initial majority of strong types. On the contrary, a high-skilled player might win with an initial majority of weak players independently of the size of the majority. For an arbitrary number of types, if some type of candidates form a strict majority at the first stage, the winner belongs either to the majoritarian type or to a more skilled one.
|Date of creation:||2014|
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- Steven D. Levitt, 2003.
"Testing Theories of Discrimination: Evidence from "Weakest Link","
NBER Working Papers
9449, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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- Marco Haan & Bart Los & Yohanes Riyanto, 2011. "Signaling strength? An analysis of decision making in The Weakest Link," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 71(4), pages 519-537, October.
- Patrick Hummel, 2008. "Iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies in binary voting agendas with sequential voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(2), pages 257-269, August.
- Bag, Parimal Kanti & Sabourian, Hamid & Winter, Eyal, 2009. "Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1278-1299, May.
- Fevrier, Philippe & Linnemer, Laurent, 2006. "Equilibrium selection: Payoff or risk dominance?: The case of the "weakest link"," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 164-181, June.
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