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Equilibrium selection: Payoff or risk dominance?: The case of the "weakest link"

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  • Fevrier, Philippe
  • Linnemer, Laurent

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  • Fevrier, Philippe & Linnemer, Laurent, 2006. "Equilibrium selection: Payoff or risk dominance?: The case of the "weakest link"," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 164-181, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:60:y:2006:i:2:p:164-181
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kenneth Clark & Stephen Kay & Martin Sefton, 2001. "When are Nash equilibria self-enforcing? An experimental analysis," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 29(4), pages 495-515.
    2. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, January.
    3. Levitt, Steven D, 2004. "Testing Theories of Discrimination: Evidence from Weakest Link," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 47(2), pages 431-452, October.
    4. repec:dgr:rugsom:02f20 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Bennett, Randall W. & Hickman, Kent A., 1993. "Rationality and the 'price is right'," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 99-105, May.
    6. Marco Haan & Bart Los & Yohanes Riyanto & Martin van Geest, 2002. "The Weakest Link - A Field Experiment in Rational Decision Making," Experimental 0203001, EconWPA.
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    Cited by:

    1. R. L. Bruno, 2008. "Rule of Law, Institutional Quality and Information," Working Papers 634, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    2. Matias Nunez & Gabriel Desranges & Mathieu Martin, 2014. "Multi-Stage Voting and Sequential Elimination with Productive Players," THEMA Working Papers 2014-07, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    3. Bagues, Manuel & Perez-Villadoniga, Maria J., 2013. "Why do I like people like me?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 1292-1299.
    4. Marco Haan & Bart Los & Yohanes Riyanto, 2011. "Signaling strength? An analysis of decision making in The Weakest Link," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 71(4), pages 519-537, October.
    5. Rui SILVA, 2018. "Equilibrium Selection in n-Person Static Games with Complete Information," Departmental Working Papers 2018-04, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    6. Levitt, Steven D, 2004. "Testing Theories of Discrimination: Evidence from Weakest Link," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 47(2), pages 431-452, October.
    7. Randolph Luca Bruno, 2006. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Rule of Law," LEM Papers Series 2006/16, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
    8. Ganna Pogrebna & Pavlo Blavatskyy, 2009. "Coordination, focal points and voting in strategic situations: a natural experiment," IEW - Working Papers 403, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.

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