Strengths of the Weakest-Link
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- Jullien, Bruno & Salanié, Bernard, 2005. "Empirical Evidence on the Preferences of Racetrack Bettors," IDEI Working Papers 178, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
More about this item
KeywordsCoordination; Pareto and risk domination; vote; game show; eld experiment;
- C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2002-11-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-2002-11-04 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2002-11-04 (Game Theory)
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