Signaling strength? An analysis of decision making in The Weakest Link
No abstract is available for this item.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 71 (2011)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/11238/PS2|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Dan Lovallo & Colin Camerer, 1999. "Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 306-318, March.
- Haan, Marco A. & Los, Bart & Riyanto, Yohanes E., 2007. "Harmful monitoring," Research Report 07003, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
- Fevrier, Philippe & Linnemer, Laurent, 2006. "Equilibrium selection: Payoff or risk dominance?: The case of the "weakest link"," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 164-181, June.
- Mailath, George J, 1987. "Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1349-1365, November.
- Kate Antonovics & Peter Arcidiacono & Randall Walsh, 2005.
"Games and Discrimination: Lessons From The Weakest Link,"
Journal of Human Resources,
University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 40(4), pages 918-947.
- Antonovics, Kate & Arcidiacono, Peter & Walsh, Randall, 2003. "Games and Discrimination: Lessons From the Weakest Link," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt3871w41j, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Nöth, Markus & Weber, Martin, 2000.
"Information Aggregation with Random Ordering: Cascades and Overconfidence,"
Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications
00-34, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Markus Noth & Martin Weber, 2003. "Information Aggregation with Random Ordering: Cascades and Overconfidence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(484), pages 166-189, January.
- Markus Noeth & Martin Weber, 2000. "Information Aggregation with Random Ordering: Cascades and Overconfidence," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1592, Econometric Society.
- Nöth, Markus & Weber, Martin, 2000. "Information aggregation with random ordering : cascades and overconficence," Papers 00-34, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
- Berk, Jonathan B & Hughson, Eric & Vandezande, Kirk, 1996. "The Price Is Right, but Are the Bids? An Investigation of Rational Decision Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 954-970, September.
- Beetsma, Roel & Schotman, Peter C, 1998.
"Measuring Risk Attitudes in a Natural Experiment: Data from the Television Game Show LINGO,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
1893, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Beetsma, Roel M W J & Schotman, Peter C, 2001. "Measuring Risk Attitudes in a Natural Experiment: Data from the Television Game Show Lingo," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(474), pages 821-848, October.
- Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & Schotman, P.C., 1998. "Measuring Risk Attitudes in a Natural Experiment: Data from The Television Game Show LINGO," Papers 98-48, Southern California - School of Business Administration.
- Levitt, Steven D, 2004.
"Testing Theories of Discrimination: Evidence from Weakest Link,"
Journal of Law and Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 47(2), pages 431-452, October.
- Steven D. Levitt, 2003. "Testing Theories of Discrimination: Evidence from "Weakest Link"," NBER Working Papers 9449, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Metrick, Andrew, 1995. "A Natural Experiment in "Jeopardy!"," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 240-253, March.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:71:y:2011:i:4:p:519-537. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.