Voting With Interdependent Values: The Condorcet Winner
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- Gershkov, Alex & Kleiner, Andreas & Moldovanu, Benny & Shi, Xianwen, 2023. "Voting with interdependent values: The Condorcet winner," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 193-208.
- Alex Gershkov & Andreas Kleiner & Benny Moldovanu & Xianwen Shi, 2023. "Voting with Interdependent Values: The Condorcet Winner," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 243, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
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More about this item
Keywords
Voting; interdependent values; Condorcet winner;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2023-05-15 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DES-2023-05-15 (Economic Design)
- NEP-MIC-2023-05-15 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2023-05-15 (Positive Political Economics)
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