Report NEP-DES-2023-05-15
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Eric Budish & Peter Cramton & Albert S. Kyle & Jeongmin Lee & David Malec, 2023, "Flow Trading," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 31098, Apr.
- Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti, 2023, "Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2304.07653, Apr.
- Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Nicholas Wu, 2023, "How Do Digital Advertising Auctions Impact Product Prices?," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2304.08432, Apr, revised Apr 2024.
- Bolotnyy, Valentin & Vasserman, Shoshana, 2023, "Scaling Auctions as Insurance: A Case Study in Infrastructure Procurement," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, number 3887, Mar.
- Alex Gershkov & Andreas Kleiner & Benny Moldovanu & Xianwen Shi, 2023, "Voting With Interdependent Values: The Condorcet Winner," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_414, Apr.
- Alex Gershkov & Benny Moldovanu & Xianwen Shi, 2023, "Order Independence in Sequential, Issue-by-Issue Voting," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_413, Apr.
- Yasunori Okumura, 2023, "Social Welfare Functions with Voters Qualifications: Impossibility Results," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2304.06961, Apr, revised Feb 2024.
- Item repec:hal:wpaper:hal-04018735 is not listed on IDEAS anymore
- Xi Chen & Binghui Peng, 2023, "Complexity of Equilibria in First-Price Auctions under General Tie-Breaking Rules," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2303.16388, Mar.
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