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Voting Weights or Agenda Control: Which One Really Matters?



Much of the EU institution literature deals with the distribution of voting power in the Council and European Parliament. The increasingly sophisticated models on EU decision making tend to overlook issues pertaining agenda formation and control in various decision making bodies. This article argues that agenda control is extremely important in all collective decision making bodies. Indeed, agenda control may render the voting power distribution issue largely irrelevant.

Suggested Citation

  • Hannu Nurmi, 2010. "Voting Weights or Agenda Control: Which One Really Matters?," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 4(1), pages 005-017, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:fau:aucocz:au2010_005

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Manfred J. Holler & Stefan Napel, 2004. "Monotonicity of power and power measures," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 56(2_2), pages 93-111, February.
    2. Turnovec, Frantisek, 1997. "Monotonicity of Power Indices," East European Series 41, Institute for Advanced Studies.
    3. McKelvey, Richard D, 1979. "General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1085-1112, September.
    4. Moulin, Herve, 1988. "Condorcet's principle implies the no show paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 53-64, June.
    5. McKelvey, Richard D. & Niemi, Richard G., 1978. "A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-22, June.
    6. -, 1986. "Agenda = Agenda," Series Históricas 2, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
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    Cited by:

    1. Hannu Nurmi, 2014. "Some remarks on the concept of proportionality," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 215(1), pages 231-244, April.

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    More about this item


    Agenda control; amendment procedure; no-show paradox; successive procedure;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General


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