Voting Weights or Agenda Control: Which One Really Matters?
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References listed on IDEAS
- Turnovec, Frantisek, 1997. "Monotonicity of Power Indices," East European Series 41, Institute for Advanced Studies.
- McKelvey, Richard D, 1979. "General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1085-1112, September.
- Moulin, Herve, 1988. "Condorcet's principle implies the no show paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 53-64, June.
- McKelvey, Richard D. & Niemi, Richard G., 1978. "A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-22, June.
- Banks, Jeffrey S., 1984. "Sophisticated Voting Outcomes and Agenda Control," Working Papers 524, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
More about this item
KeywordsAgenda control; amendment procedure; no-show paradox; successive procedure;
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
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