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The evolution of tax structures

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  • James Alt

Abstract

Certain themes recur throughout this paper. The traditional account of the evolution of tax structures through the interaction of increasing efficiency and the claims of special interests plays a role but is not the whole story. Different taxes create tradeoffs between the costs of administration and compliance. Specification of these costs creates a framework in which long-term trends like the growth and centralization of revenues and the increasing dependence on direct taxation can be understood. This framework applies to observable collective decisions to alter tax structures. Uncertainty about ultimate incidence plays a major role in such decisions. It also applies to the decentralized context of adjustment and resistance. This framework can be used to investigate the extent of redistribution within tax systems and of the requirement of frequent reforms to sustain redistribution against resistance. The simultaneous consideration of economic and political aspects of taxation can only improve future research. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1983

Suggested Citation

  • James Alt, 1983. "The evolution of tax structures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 181-222, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:41:y:1983:i:1:p:181-222
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00124058
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    Cited by:

    1. Stenkula Mikael, 2014. "Swedish Taxation in a 150-year Perspective," Nordic Tax Journal, Sciendo, vol. 2014(2), pages 10-42, November.
    2. Lassen, David Dreyer, 2007. "Ethnic divisions, trust, and the size of the informal sector," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 423-438, July.
    3. Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Claus Thustrup Kreiner & Emmanuel Saez, 2016. "Why Can Modern Governments Tax So Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 83(330), pages 219-246, April.
    4. Benjamin Eden, 2009. "The Role of Government in the Credit Market," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0907, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    5. Cecil Bohanon & James McClure, 1986. "Taxes, welfare costs, and public consumption: The case of the unwitting monopsonist," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 235-247, January.
    6. Slemrod, Joel & Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 2002. "Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 22, pages 1423-1470, Elsevier.
    7. Benjamin Eden, 2007. "The Friedman Rule in an Overlapping Generations Model: Social Security in Reverse," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0717, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    8. Leopoldo Fergusson & Carlos Molina & Juan Felipe Riaño, 2019. "Consumers as VAT “Evaders”: Incidence, Social Bias, and Correlates in Colombia," Economía Journal, The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association - LACEA, vol. 0(Spring 20), pages 21-67, April.
    9. Kalina Koleva, 2005. "Seeking for an optimal tax administration: the efficiency costs’ approach [A la recherche de l'administration fiscale optimale : l'approche par les coûts d'efficience]," Post-Print halshs-00195354, HAL.
    10. Rathke, Alex Augusto Timm & Rezende, Amaury José, 2016. "Exploring the characteristics of transfer pricing systems across countries," MPRA Paper 70437, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Gradus, R.H.J.M., 1989. "Optimal dynamic taxation, saving and investment," Other publications TiSEM eed2cea0-a246-4791-a619-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    12. Finn Kydland, 1983. "Implications of dynamic optimal taxation for the evolution of tax structures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 229-235, January.
    13. Benjamin Eden, 2008. "Implementing the Friedman Rule by a Government Loan Program: An Overlapping Generations Model," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0804, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    14. José Alves, 2018. "Tax incidence and fiscal systems: some problems on tax compared history in XIX and XX centuries," Working Papers REM 2018/45, ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, REM, Universidade de Lisboa.
    15. Claudio Agostini & Pablo Correa & Carla Maldonado & Max Spiess, 2021. "Hoja en blanco: hacia una nueva institucionalidad y régimen tributario para Chile," Estudios Públicos, Centro de Estudios Públicos, vol. 0(161), pages 153-186.
    16. Rathke, Alex Augusto Timm & Rezende, Amaury José, 2016. "Exploring the characteristics of transfer pricing systems across countries," EconStor Preprints 130141, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    17. Kalina Koleva, 2005. "A la recherche de l'administration fiscale optimale : l'approche par les coûts d'efficience," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques r05050, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
    18. Valerio Dotti, 2021. "Reaching across the aisle to block reforms," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(2), pages 533-578, September.
    19. Adi Brender, 2005. "Ethnic Segregation and the Quality of Local Government in the Minorities Localities: Local Tax Collection in the Israeli-Arab Municipalities as a Case Study," Bank of Israel Working Papers 2005.01, Bank of Israel.
    20. Marion, Justin & Muehlegger, Erich, 2007. "Measuring Illegal Activity and the Effects of Regulatory Innovation: A Study of Diesel Fuel Tax Evasion," Working Paper Series rwp07-026, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    21. Dotti, Valerio, 2019. "Political Parties and Policy Outcomes. Do Parties Block Reforms?," MPRA Paper 100227, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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