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Senatorial responsiveness, the characteristics of the polity and the political cycle

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  • Kenneth Greene
  • Hadi Salavitabar

Abstract

Before one can measure the independence of a Senator from his constituent interests by measuring the differences between his rating by an organization like the Conservative Coalition and the average rating of Congressmen in his state, one must articulate the underlying model describing whose preferences the Congressman represents. If the median voter model is used, then one must further define one's assumption about the shape of the underlying distribution of preferences in each district. If the distribution is normal, then the Amacher-Boyes measure is acceptable, if it is not, then another measure is implied. We have assumed that the underlying distribution is lognormal and have deduced alternative independence scores. We have shown that the characteristics of a Senator's polity apparently do influence his independence score. Bigger and less homogeneous polities possess Senators that are more independent. We do not find any evidence that there is a political cycle in senatorial independence. This does not mean to deny, however, that Frey and Schneider (1978) have found some support for a political business cycle and Pommerehne, Frey and Schneider (1978) have found evidence for the possibility that nearness to election may hold down public personnel expenditures. Our data merely indicates a lack of corroboration of the importance of the political cycle for some reasonable measures of representational independence. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1982

Suggested Citation

  • Kenneth Greene & Hadi Salavitabar, 1982. "Senatorial responsiveness, the characteristics of the polity and the political cycle," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 263-269, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:38:y:1982:i:3:p:263-269
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00144852
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ryan Amacher & William Boyes, 1978. "Cycles in senatorial voting behavior: implications for the optimal frequency of elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 5-13, January.
    2. Albert Breton, 1974. "The economic theory of representative government: A reply," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 129-133, December.
    3. Werner W. Pommerehne & Friedrich Schneider*, 1978. "Fiscal Illusion, Political Institutions, And Local Public Spending," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(3), pages 381-408, August.
    4. Olson, Mancur, Jr, 1969. "The Principle of "Fiscal Equivalence": The Division of Responsibilities among Different Levels of Government," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 479-487, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. A. Glazer & M. Robbins, 1985. "How elections matter: A study of U.S. senators," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(2), pages 163-172, January.

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