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Vincent Ostrom’s revolutionary science of association

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  • Michael Fotos

Abstract

Vincent Ostrom challenged epistemic choices at the foundation of modern political science and proposed an alternative conceptualization of democracy based on a theory of federalism he derived from The Federalist and Tocqueville’s Democracy in America. This essay examines Vincent Ostrom’s critique of contemporary mainstream political theorizing, relates his original theoretical work to the empirical research Elinor Ostrom, other colleagues, and he conducted, advised, or sponsored at The Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis Indiana University, and concludes that “Ostrom’s democratic alternative” constitutes an alternative scientific paradigm as defined by Thomas Kuhn. The paper concludes with a comment on the continuing relevance of Ostrom’s critique in the post-9/11 era. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Fotos, 2015. "Vincent Ostrom’s revolutionary science of association," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 163(1), pages 67-83, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:163:y:2015:i:1:p:67-83
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-015-0235-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    2. Elinor Ostrom, 2010. "Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(3), pages 641-672, June.
    3. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    4. Coase, R H, 1974. "The Lighthouse in Economics," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(2), pages 357-376, October.
    5. Ostrom, Vincent & Tiebout, Charles M. & Warren, Robert, 1961. "The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(4), pages 831-842, December.
    6. Olson, Mancur, Jr, 1969. "The Principle of "Fiscal Equivalence": The Division of Responsibilities among Different Levels of Government," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 479-487, May.
    7. Ostrom, Elinor & Walker, James & Gardner, Roy, 1992. "Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 86(2), pages 404-417, June.
    8. Ostrom, Vincent, 1977. "Some Problems in Doing Political Theory: A Response to Golembiewski's “Critique”," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 71(4), pages 1508-1525, December.
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    1. Paul Lewis & John Meadowcroft, 2024. "Constitutional artisans: James Buchanan and Vincent Ostrom on artifactual man, the constitutional attitude, and the political economy of constitutional design," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 363-387, September.

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