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Why the Traditional Distinction between Public and Private Goods Should be Abandoned

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  • Jesse Malkin
  • Aaron Wildavsky

Abstract

In this paper we challenge the traditional distinction between public goods and private goods. Economists use a definition of public goods that rests on the inherent properties of the good itself. Referring to criteria such as non-rivalness and non-excludability, they assert that the distinction is fixed in nature and cannot be altered by human observes. We argue that the boundary between public and private goods is socially constructed. That is, what is a public good and what is a private good is not determined by fixed criteria; rather it is decided by society. Thus, what is a public good in one community might be a private good in another. It is this moveable boundary between public and private that makes it essential to analyźe public policy with values up front, not hidden behind the seemingly technical concept of public goods.

Suggested Citation

  • Jesse Malkin & Aaron Wildavsky, 1991. "Why the Traditional Distinction between Public and Private Goods Should be Abandoned," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 3(4), pages 355-378, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:3:y:1991:i:4:p:355-378
    DOI: 10.1177/0951692891003004001
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    2. Maxime Desmarais-Tremblay, 2014. "On the Definition of Public Goods. Assessing Richard A. Musgrave's contribution," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 14004, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    3. Marco Verweij, 2009. "Is International Customary Law Coordinated, Constructed, or Contested?. Comment," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 165(1), pages 95-98, March.
    4. Gisela Di Meglio, 2013. "The place of ServPPINs in the range of public–private collaboration arrangements for services provision," Chapters, in: Faïz Gallouj & Luis Rubalcaba & Paul Windrum (ed.), Public–Private Innovation Networks in Services, chapter 3, pages 59-87, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Priddat, Birger P., 2008. "Öffentliche Güter als politische Güter," ZögU - Zeitschrift für öffentliche und gemeinwirtschaftliche Unternehmen, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 31(2), pages 152-173.
    6. Yang, Chia-yen, 2000. "The organizational choice of public good provision," ISU General Staff Papers 2000010108000013664, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.

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