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Fonctions d'utilité interdépendantes et théorie de la redistribution en économie d'échange

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  • Christian Morrisson
  • Philippe Cazenave

Abstract

[fre] Les fonctions d'utilité classiques sont indépendantes et impliquent un compor­tement individualiste difficile a concilier avec l'existence des transferts. Or, l'introduction de fonctions d'utilité interdépendantes conduit à un équilibre de Lindahl qui constitue un optimum parétien, mais cet équilibre implique l'existence de transferts volontaires, permanents et optimaux. L'absence de transferts peut s'interpréter de façon plus réaliste comme la conséquence d'une bénévolence faible plutôt que d'un véritable individualisme. La notion d'équilibre de Lindahl peut d'autre part se généraliser au cas des transferts forcés. Enfin, l'existence de transferts n'implique pas toujours une psychologie bénévole : en régime d'incer­titude, des transferts peuvent être consentis volontairement afin de réduire, dans une perspective égoïste, la probabilité de transferts forcés. [eng] Classical utility functions are independent and imply an individualism which is inconsistent with the study of social interactions and particularly of transfers. The existence of interdependent preferences leads to a Lindahl equilibrium which is Pareto optimal, but implies voluntary, permanent and optimal transfers. The absence of transfers may be considered in a more realistic way as the consequence or weak benevolence rather than real individualism. On the other hand, the notion of Lindahl equilibrium may be generalized to the case of compulsory transfers. Under uncertainty transfers do not necessarily imply benevolence, voluntary transfers may be accepted, out of sheer selfishness, in order to reduce the probability of compulsory transfers.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian Morrisson & Philippe Cazenave, 1972. "Fonctions d'utilité interdépendantes et théorie de la redistribution en économie d'échange," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 23(2), pages 214-242.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1972_num_23_2_408018
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1972.408018
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1972.408018
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    References listed on IDEAS

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