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On the Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods

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  • Brito, Dagobert L
  • Oakland, William H

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  • Brito, Dagobert L & Oakland, William H, 1980. "On the Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(4), pages 691-704, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:70:y:1980:i:4:p:691-704
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    Cited by:

    1. Ingrid Ott & Stephen J. Turnovsky, 2006. "Excludable and Non-excludable Public Inputs: Consequences for Economic Growth," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 73(292), pages 725-748, November.
    2. Kurtis J. Swope & Eckhard Janeba, 2005. "Taxes or Fees? The Political Economy of Providing Excludable Public Goods," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 7(3), pages 405-426, August.
    3. Sören Blomquist & Vidar Christiansen, 2005. "The Role of Prices for Excludable Public Goods," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 12(1), pages 61-79, January.
    4. Marco Sahm, 2015. "Advance-Purchase Financing of Projects with Few Buyers," CESifo Working Paper Series 5560, CESifo Group Munich.
    5. Peter Norman, 2004. "Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(4), pages 1163-1188.
    6. Fraser, Clive D., 2000. "When Is Efficiency Separable from Distribution in the Provision of Club Goods?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 204-221, February.
    7. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:8:y:2006:i:4:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Paul Madden, 2008. "Price, quality and welfare consequences of alternative club objectives in a professional sport league," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0802, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    9. Se-il Mun, 2016. "Joint Provision of International Transport Infrastructure," Discussion papers e-15-015, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.
    10. Hines Jr., James R., 2000. "What is benefit taxation?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 483-492, March.
    11. Clive Fraser & Ali al-Nowaihi, 2006. "Comparing the first-best and second-best provision of a club good: an example," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 8(4), pages 1-6.
    12. Claude Le Pen, 1982. "L'analyse microéconomique de la production dramatique et l'effet des subventions publiques," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 33(4), pages 639-674.
    13. Norman,P., 2000. "Efficient mechanisms for public goods with use exclusions," Working papers 15, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    14. Fraser, Clive D., 1996. "On the provision of excludable public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 111-130, April.
    15. Fuest, Clemens & Kolmar, Martin, 2007. "A theory of user-fee competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(3-4), pages 497-509, April.
    16. Bernd Huber & Marco Runkel, 2009. "Tax competition, excludable public goods, and user charges," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 16(3), pages 321-336, June.
    17. Francesconi, Marco & Muthoo, Abhinay, 2006. "Control Rights in Public-Private Partnerships," CEPR Discussion Papers 5733, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. Sahm, Marco, 2015. "Advance-Purchase Financing of Projects with Few Buyers," Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113122, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    19. Bag, Parimal Kanti & Winter, Eyal, 1999. "Simple Subscription Mechanisms for Excludable Public Goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 72-94, July.
    20. al-Nowaihi, Ali & Fraser, Clive D., 2007. "Is the public sector too large in an economy with club goods? A case when consumers differ in both tastes and incomes," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1018-1031, November.
    21. Clemens Fuest & Martin Kolmar, 2013. "Endogenous free riding and the decentralized user-fee financing of spillover goods in a n-region economy," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 20(2), pages 169-191, April.
    22. Leon Taylor, 1998. "The environmental protection authority as a monopoly," Public Economics 9810007, EconWPA.
    23. Sahm, Marco, 2016. "Advance-purchase financing of projects with few buyers," BERG Working Paper Series 118, Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group.
    24. Noriaki Matsushima & Ryusuke Shinohara, 2015. "The efficiency of monopolistic provision of public goods through simultaneous bilateral bargaining," ISER Discussion Paper 0948, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.

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