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Constitutional control of processes and their outcomes

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This paper explores the distinction between processes of decision making and their outcomes in the context of the individualistic constitutional calculus. The motivation is primarily methodological. A taxonomy and analytic framework are suggested which explicitly recognize the possible motivations of the constitution setter, and which allow decision making processes to be viewed as both means and ends. The framework is utilized to provide a critical review of some aspects of the received literature. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1984

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  • A. Hamlin, 1984. "Constitutional control of processes and their outcomes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 133-145, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:42:y:1984:i:2:p:133-145
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00124156
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    Cited by:

    1. Alan P. Hamlin, 1991. "Decentralization, Competition and the Efficiency of Federalism," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 67(3), pages 193-204, September.
    2. Alan P. Hamlin, 1985. "Federalism, Horizontal Equity, and the Optimal Grant," Public Finance Review, , vol. 13(2), pages 115-131, April.
    3. A. Hamlin, 1985. "The political economy of constitutional federalism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(2), pages 187-195, January.

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