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A decentralized mechanism for siting hazardous waste disposal facilities

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  • David Goetze

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  • David Goetze, 1982. "A decentralized mechanism for siting hazardous waste disposal facilities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 361-370, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:39:y:1982:i:3:p:361-370
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00118793
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Smith, Vernon L, 1980. "Experiments with a Decentralized Mechanism for Public Good Decisions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(4), pages 584-599, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nicolas Marchetti, 2004. "Face to Face Negotiation to Overcome the Nimby Syndrome: Theory and Experimental Design," CIRANO Working Papers 2004s-53, CIRANO.
    2. Martin Besfamille & Jean-Marie Lozachmeur, 2010. "NIMBY and mechanism design under different constitutional constraints," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 17(2), pages 114-132, April.
    3. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2003:i:22:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS

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