IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/17111.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Decentralization and local public goods: getting the incentives right

Author

Listed:
  • Roumasset, James

Abstract

The paper addresses the nature and locus of appropriate government control in the provision of collective services. It suggests some useful principles for determining organizational structures with the appropriate degree and form of decentralization, which is seen to be an important part of incentive compatibility. In the case of low-income housing it cites the privatization of sites and services and devolution of upgrading as two promising models of decentralization.

Suggested Citation

  • Roumasset, James, 1989. "Decentralization and local public goods: getting the incentives right," MPRA Paper 17111, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:17111
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17111/5/MPRA_paper_17111.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Groves, Theodore & Ledyard, John O, 1977. "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(4), pages 783-809, May.
    2. Harberger, Arnold C, 1978. "On the Use of Distributional Weights in Social Cost-Benefit Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(2), pages 87-120, April.
    3. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    4. Demsetz, Harold, 1969. "Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(1), pages 1-22, April.
    5. Smith, Vernon L, 1980. "Experiments with a Decentralized Mechanism for Public Good Decisions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(4), pages 584-599, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Roumasset, James, 2004. "Rural Institutions, Agricultural Development, and Pro-Poor Economic Growth," Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Southeast Asian Regional Center for Graduate Study and Research in Agriculture (SEARCA), vol. 1(1), pages 1-20, June.
    2. Roumasset, James, 1992. "INVESTING in Agriculturally-Led Growth: The Philippine Case," MPRA Paper 14847, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Karl Jandoc & Ruben Juarez & James Roumasset, 2014. "Towards an Economics of Irrigation Networks," Working Papers 201416, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    4. Majah-Leah Ravago & James Roumasset, 2016. "The Public Economics of Electricity Policy with Philippine Applications," Working Papers 201613, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    5. Majah-Leah Ravago & James Roumasset, 2009. "Economic Policy for Sustainable Growth and Development vs. Greedy Growth and Preservationism," Working Papers 200909, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    6. Ballesteros, Marife M., 2002. "Rethinking Institutional Reforms in the Philippine Housing Sector," Discussion Papers DP 2002-16, Philippine Institute for Development Studies.
    7. Roumasset, James & Ravago, Majah-Leah & Jandoc, Karl & Arellano, Clarissa, 2016. "Environmental Resources, Shocks, and National Well-Being," MPRA Paper 87715, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bennett, Jeffrey W. & Carter, Marc, 1993. "Prospects For Contingent Valuation: Lessons From The South-East Forests," Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 37(2), pages 1-15, August.
    2. Hummel Jeffrey Rogers & Lavoie Don, 1994. "National Defense And The Public-Goods Problem," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 5(2-3), pages 1-26, June.
    3. David Gindis, 0. "On the origins, meaning and influence of Jensen and Meckling’s definition of the firm," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 72(4), pages 966-984.
    4. Gérard Charreaux, 2000. "L'approche économico-financière de l'investissement: une vision critique," Working Papers CREGO 1000501, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    5. Harrison, Glenn W & Hirshleifer, Jack, 1989. "An Experimental Evaluation of Weakest Link/Best Shot Models of Public Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(1), pages 201-225, February.
    6. Roumasset, James A., 1994. "Explaining Diversity In Agricultural Organization: An Agency Perspective," Bulletins 12982, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center.
    7. Bruno Tinel, 2004. "Que reste-t-il de la contribution d'Alchian et Demsetz à la théorie de l'entreprise ?," Post-Print halshs-00270895, HAL.
    8. Sven Fischer & Andreas Nicklisch, 2006. "Ex Interim Voting in Public Good Provision," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-13, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
    9. Spencer, Michael A. & Swallow, Stephen K. & Shogren, Jason F. & List, John A., 2009. "Rebate rules in threshold public good provision," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(5-6), pages 798-806, June.
    10. Ledyard, John O., "undated". "Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research," Working Papers 861, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    11. Randall, Alan, 1982. "Economic Surplus Concepts and Their Use in Benefit Cost Analysis," Review of Marketing and Agricultural Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 50(02), pages 1-29, August.
    12. Etienne Farvaque & Catherine Refait-Alexandre & Dhafer Saïdane, 2011. "Corporate disclosure: A review of its (direct and indirect) benefits and costs," International Economics, CEPII research center, issue 128, pages 5-31.
    13. Louis De Alessi, 1989. "The Effect of Institutions on the Choices of Consumers and Providers of Health Care," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 1(4), pages 427-458, October.
    14. James Roumasset, 2010. "Wither the Economics of Agricultural Development?," Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Southeast Asian Regional Center for Graduate Study and Research in Agriculture (SEARCA), vol. 7(1), pages 1-22, June.
    15. Zou, L., 1993. "Ownership structure and efficiency : An incentive mechanism approach," Other publications TiSEM a72a05c2-b3f2-47c7-a003-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    16. Steven Johnson, 1984. "Demand-revealing processes and accounting standard-setting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 3-24, January.
    17. Sikka, Prem & Stittle, John, 2019. "Debunking the myth of shareholder ownership of companies: Some implications for corporate governance and financial reporting," CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    18. Josef Falkinger, 2000. "A Simple Mechanism for the Efficient Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 247-264, March.
    19. Richard Windram, 2005. "Risk‐Taking Incentives: A Review of the Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(1), pages 65-90, February.
    20. Zou, L., 1989. "Ownership structure and efficiency : An incentive mechanism approach," Discussion Paper 1989-55, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    decentralization; incentive compatible; devolution;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • H76 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Other Expenditure Categories
    • J18 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Public Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:17111. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.