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A theory of exchange, philanthropy and appropriation

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  • Albert Danielsen

Abstract

The interdependent utility model developed here should be viewed as a closer approximation to reality than the independent utility function selected by Pareto and honored Allen when he led in its adoption by English-speaking economists. The strengths and weaknesses of the interdependent model are similar to those of the traditional model. The unique contribution is the formal inclusion of appropriation. Economists have generally ignored appropriation as an integral form of human behavior or they have viewed it from a normative point of view. 5 Appropriation is a form of human behavior as important as exchange. If one assumes the structure of society given then exchange is probably the more important, but if one seeks to understand changes in the structure of society appropriation must bulk large in the analysis. Institutions are changed in specific ways through struggles between individual and groups to shape the world to their own liking. The means employed may be legitimate or illegitimate; the appropriator may use government to attain his ends or he may “offend” government and subject himself to prosecution and incarceration. Governmental accolade and/or condemnation does not change the basic nature of the phenomena. Copyright Center for Study of Public Choice Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 1975

Suggested Citation

  • Albert Danielsen, 1975. "A theory of exchange, philanthropy and appropriation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 13-26, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:24:y:1975:i:1:p:13-26
    DOI: 10.1007/BF01718412
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kenneth E. Boulding, 1962. "Notes on a Theory of Philanthropy," NBER Chapters, in: Philanthropy and Public Policy, pages 57-72, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Lawrence D. Schall, 1972. "Interdependent Utilities and Pareto Optimality," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 86(1), pages 19-24.
    3. Lester C. Thurow, 1971. "The Income Distribution as a Pure Public Good," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 85(2), pages 327-336.
    4. Frank G. Dickinson, 1962. "Philanthropy and Public Policy," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number dick62-1, July.
    5. Ehrlich, Isaac, 1973. "Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(3), pages 521-565, May-June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Zoltan J. Acs & David Audretsch & Ronnie J. Phillips & Sameeksha Desai, 2007. "The Entrepreneurship-Philanthropy Nexus: Nonmarket Source of American Entrepreneurial Capitalism," Jena Economics Research Papers 2007-025, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    2. Sameeksha Desai & Zoltan J. Acs, 2008. "Democratic Capitalism and Philanthropy in a Global Economy," International Studies in Entrepreneurship, in: Zoltan J. Acs & Roger R. Stough (ed.), Public Policy in an Entrepreneurial Economy, chapter 11, pages 281-293, Springer.
    3. Cai, Meina & Caskey, Gregory W. & Cowen, Nick & Murtazashvili, Ilia & Murtazashvili, Jennifer Brick & Salahodjaev, Raufhon, 2022. "Individualism, economic freedom, and charitable giving," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 200(C), pages 868-884.

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