Some notes on voting schemes and the will of the majority
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DOI: 10.1007/BF01718734
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- Gordon Tullock, 1967. "The General Irrelevance of the General Impossibility Theorem," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 81(2), pages 256-270.
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- Scott Feld & Bernard Grofman, 1988. "Majority rule outcomes and the structure of debate in one-issue-at-a-time decision-making," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(3), pages 239-252, December.
- Bernard Grofman, 2016. "Memories of an altruist who denied the importance of altruism," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 115-116, July.
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