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A distributive N-amendment game with endogenous agenda formation

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  • Elizabeth Penn

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  • Elizabeth Penn, 2008. "A distributive N-amendment game with endogenous agenda formation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(1), pages 201-213, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:136:y:2008:i:1:p:201-213
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-008-9291-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John Duggan, 2006. "Endogenous Voting Agendas," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(3), pages 495-530, December.
    2. Norman Schofield, 1978. "Instability of Simple Dynamic Games," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 45(3), pages 575-594.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gilat Levy & Ronnie Razin, 2009. "Gradualism in Dynamic Agenda Formation," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 543, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    2. Vicki Knoblauch, 2020. "Von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set rationalization of choice functions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 89(3), pages 369-381, October.
    3. Hannu Vartiainen, 2015. "Dynamic stable set as a tournament solution," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(2), pages 309-327, September.
    4. Salvador Barberà & Anke Gerber, 2017. "Deciding on what to Decide," Working Papers 973, Barcelona School of Economics.

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