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Outsourcing in US cities, ambulances and elderly voters

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  • Matthew Holian

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Suggested Citation

  • Matthew Holian, 2009. "Outsourcing in US cities, ambulances and elderly voters," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(3), pages 421-445, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:141:y:2009:i:3:p:421-445
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9462-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 1997. "Privatization in the United States," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(3), pages 447-471, Autumn.
    2. Bajari, Patrick & Tadelis, Steven, 2001. "Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 387-407, Autumn.
    3. Oliver Hart & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(4), pages 1127-1161.
    4. Poterba, James M, 1998. "Demographic Change, Intergenerational Linkages, and Public Education," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 315-320, May.
    5. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, April.
    6. Trevor L. Brown & Matthew Potoski, 2003. "Managing contract performance: A transaction costs approach," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 22(2), pages 275-297.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Cheongsin Kim, 2015. "The Effects of Recessions on Contracting Moderated by Institutional Arrangements of Government: Evidence From California Cities, 1993–2009," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(2), pages 40-65, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Outsourcing privatization bureaucracy; D23; D72; H11; H40; L24;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures

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