IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cai/recosp/reco_573_0529.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Le rôle de l'autorité publique dans la gestion des services publics locaux. Une approche par la théorie des contrats incomplets

Author

Listed:
  • Claudine Desrieux

Abstract

Three organizational structures of local public services, namely Anglo-Saxon public-private partnership, ?delegation of public services? as implemented in France, and public management, are analysed in this article through the incomplete contract theory approach. The role of the public authority varies significantly in each of these structures, and the following model aims to evaluate the efficiency of these different organizational forms. The results indicate in which cases one precise structure proves to be more efficient than the others. Classification JEL: D23, H7, H11, L33

Suggested Citation

  • Claudine Desrieux, 2006. "Le rôle de l'autorité publique dans la gestion des services publics locaux. Une approche par la théorie des contrats incomplets," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 57(3), pages 529-539.
    • Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_573_0529
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=RECO_573_0529
    Download Restriction: free
    File URL: http://www.cairn.info/revue-economique-2006-3-page-529.htm
    Download Restriction: free
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 1997. "Privatization in the United States," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(3), pages 447-471, Autumn.
    2. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, April.
    3. Oliver Hart & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(4), pages 1127-1161.
    4. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Bonnafous, Alain, 2010. "Programming, optimal pricing and partnership contract for infrastructures in PPPs," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 15-22.
    2. Alain Bonnafous & Bruno Faivre d'Arcier, 2013. "The conditions of efficiency of a PPP for public finances," Post-Print halshs-00876446, HAL.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. David Martimort & Flavio Menezes & Myrna Wooders & ELISABETTA IOSSA & DAVID MARTIMORT, 2015. "The Simple Microeconomics of Public-Private Partnerships," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(1), pages 4-48, February.
    2. Zheng Wang & John S. Heywood & Guangliang Ye, 2020. "Optimal mixed ownership: A contract view," Economics of Transition and Institutional Change, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 28(1), pages 45-68, January.
    3. Paul Walker, 2016. "From complete to incomplete (contracts): A survey of the mainstream approach to the theory of privatisation," New Zealand Economic Papers, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 50(2), pages 212-229, August.
    4. Matthew Holian, 2009. "Outsourcing in US cities, ambulances and elderly voters," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(3), pages 421-445, December.
    5. Bennedsen, Morten & Schultz, Christian, 2011. "Arm's length delegation of public services," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 543-552.
    6. Lulfesmann, Christoph, 2007. "On the virtues of privatization when government is benevolent," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 17-34, September.
    7. Gui, Emi Minghui & Diesendorf, Mark & MacGill, Iain, 2017. "Distributed energy infrastructure paradigm: Community microgrids in a new institutional economics context," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 1355-1365.
    8. Eshien Chong & Freddy Huet, 2010. "Partenariats public-privé et investissements de fin de contrat : le cas de l'industrie de l'eau en France," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 76(4), pages 413-448.
    9. Bennedsen, Morten & Schultz, Christian, 2003. "Outsourcing, Market Structure and Elections," Working Papers 07-2003, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
    10. Macauley, Molly & Walls, Margaret & Anderson, Soren, 2002. "The Organization of Local Solid Waste and Recycling Markets: Public and Private Provision of Services," RFF Working Paper Series dp-02-35-rev, Resources for the Future.
    11. Druk-Gal, Bat-Sheva & Yaari, Varda, 2006. "Incumbent employees' resistance to implementing privatization policy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 374-405, March.
    12. Desrieux, Claudine & Chong, Eshien & Saussier, Stéphane, 2013. "Putting all one's eggs in one basket: Relational contracts and the management of local public services," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 167-186.
    13. Morten Bennedsen & Christian Schultz, 2007. "Arm’s Length Provision of Public Services," CIE Discussion Papers 2007-12, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
    14. Fredrik Andersson & Henrik Jordahl & Jens Josephson, 2019. "Outsourcing Public Services: Contractibility, Cost, and Quality," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 65(4), pages 349-372.
    15. Julie Brux & Claudine Desrieux, 2014. "To allot or not to allot public services? An incomplete contract approach," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 455-476, June.
    16. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2015. "Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 23-31.
    17. Moen, Espen R. & ,, 2003. "The Proper Scope of Governments When Costs are Contractible," CEPR Discussion Papers 3992, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. Eero Lehto, 2006. "The Choice Between the In-house Provision and the Competitive Out-house Provision of Public Services," Working Papers 216, Työn ja talouden tutkimus LABORE, The Labour Institute for Economic Research LABORE.
    19. Bennedsen, Morten & Schultz, Christian, 2003. "Adaptive Contracting," Working Papers 08-2003, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
    20. Torben Pedersen & Steen Thomsen, 2003. "Ownership Structure and Value of the Largest European Firms: The Importance of Owner Identity," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 7(1), pages 27-55, March.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_573_0529. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cairn.info/revue-economique.htm .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.