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Le rôle de l'autorité publique dans la gestion des services publics locaux. Une approche par la théorie des contrats incomplets

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  • Claudine Desrieux

Abstract

Three organizational structures of local public services, namely Anglo-Saxon public-private partnership, “delegation of public services” as implemented in France, and public management, are analysed in this article through the incomplete contract theory approach. The role of the public authority varies significantly in each of these structures, and the following model aims to evaluate the efficiency of these different organizational forms. The results indicate in which cases one precise structure proves to be more efficient than the others. Classification JEL: D23, H7, H11, L33

Suggested Citation

  • Claudine Desrieux, 2006. "Le rôle de l'autorité publique dans la gestion des services publics locaux. Une approche par la théorie des contrats incomplets," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 57(3), pages 529-539.
    • Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_573_0529
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Oliver Hart & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1127-1161.
    2. repec:hrv:faseco:30727607 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. repec:hrv:faseco:30727606 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. Bonnafous, Alain, 2010. "Programming, optimal pricing and partnership contract for infrastructures in PPPs," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 15-22.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out

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