The Organization of Local Solid Waste and Recycling Markets: Public and Private Provision of Services
We study determinants of market organization of local public services by an empiricalexamination of one of the most visible municipal services, residential waste management. Usinga multinomial logit model and data for 1,000 U.S. communities, we explore the effect of politicalinfluence, voter ideology, environmental constraints, production costs (i.e., “economies ofdensity”), and contracting transaction costs on a community’s choice of market arrangement forwaste collection and recycling. We find that cost factors are a significant determinant of servicedelivery method. In contrast, few of the political variables are statistically significant. Theseresults hold for our models of both waste and recycling, lending further evidence to theconclusion that local governments emphasize costs when choosing between private and publicprovision.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Florencio Lopez-deSilanes & Andrei Shleifer & Rober Vishny, 1995.
"Privatization in the United States,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1723, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Edlin, Aaron S & Hermalin, Benjamin E, 2000. "Contract Renegotiation and Options in Agency Problems," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 395-423, October.
- Nelson, Michael A, 1997. "Municipal Government Approaches to Service Delivery: An Analysis from a Transactions Cost Perspective," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(1), pages 82-96, January.
- George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
- Oliver Hart & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996.
"The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons,"
NBER Working Papers
5744, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Oliver Hart & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1127-1161.
- Oliver Hart & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 1996. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1778, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Williamson, Oliver E, 1999. "Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 306-42, April.
- Edwards, Franklin R & Stevens, Barbara J, 1978. "The Provision of Municipal Sanitation Services by Private Firms: An Empirical Analysis of the Efficiency of Alternative Market Structures and Regulatory Arrangements," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(2), pages 133-47, December.
- Kinnaman, Thomas C. & Fullerton, Don, 2000. "Garbage and Recycling with Endogenous Local Policy," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 419-442, November.
- Wayne Carroll, 1995. "The Organization and Efficiency of Residential Recycling Services," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 21(2), pages 215-225, Spring.
- Williamson, Oliver E, 1979. "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractural Relations," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 233-61, October.
- Dubin, Jeffrey A. & Navarro, Peter., 1987.
"How Markets for Impure Public Goods Organize: The Case of Household Refuse Collection,"
633, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Dubin, Jeffrey A & Navarro, Peter, 1988. "How Markets for Impure Public Goods Organize: The Case of Household Refuse Collection," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(2), pages 217-41, Fall.
- Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
- Boycko, Maxim & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1996. "A Theory of Privatisation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(435), pages 309-19, March.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-02-35-rev. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Webmaster)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.