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Mr. Smith and the economy: the influence of economic conditions on individual legislator voting

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  • Edward López
  • Carlos Ramírez

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  • Edward López & Carlos Ramírez, 2008. "Mr. Smith and the economy: the influence of economic conditions on individual legislator voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(1), pages 1-17, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:136:y:2008:i:1:p:1-17
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-007-9275-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Grier, Kevin B & McGarrity, Joseph P, 1998. "The Effect of Macroeconomic Fluctuations on the Electoral Fortunes of House Incumbents," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 143-161, April.
    2. Stratmann, Thomas, 2000. "Congressional Voting over Legislative Careers: Shifting Positions and Changing Constraints," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(3), pages 665-676, September.
    3. Levitt, Steven D, 1996. "How Do Senators Vote? Disentangling the Role of Voter Preferences, Party Affiliation, and Senate Ideology," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 425-441, June.
    4. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
    5. Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753.
    6. Edward López & Carlos Ramírez, 2004. "Party Polarization and the Business Cycle in the United States," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(3), pages 413-430, February.
    7. Denzau, Arthur T. & Munger, Michael C., 1986. "Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 80(1), pages 89-106, March.
    8. Peltzman, Sam, 1985. "An Economic Interpretation of the History of Congressional Voting in the Twentieth Century," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 656-675, September.
    9. Arsene Aka & W. Robert Reed & D. Eric Schansberg & Zhen Zhu, 1996. "Is There A “Culture Of Spending” In Congress?," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(3), pages 191-211, November.
    10. Herron, Michael C., 2000. "Cutpoint-Adjusted Interest Group Ratings," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 8(4), pages 346-366, July.
    11. Groseclose, Tim & Levitt, Steven D. & Snyder, James M., 1999. "Comparing Interest Group Scores across Time and Chambers: Adjusted ADA Scores for the U.S. Congress," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 93(1), pages 33-50, March.
    12. W. Reed & D. Schansberg & James Wilbanks & Zhen Zhu, 1998. "The relationship between congressional spending and tenure with an application to term limits," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(1), pages 85-104, January.
    13. Baltagi, Badi H. & Wu, Ping X., 1999. "Unequally Spaced Panel Data Regressions With Ar(1) Disturbances," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(6), pages 814-823, December.
    14. Keith Poole, 2007. "Changing minds? Not in Congress!," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(3), pages 435-451, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tanger, Shaun M. & Zeng, Peng & Morse, Wayde & Laband, David N., 2011. "Macroeconomic conditions in the U.S. and congressional voting on environmental policy: 1970-2008," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(6), pages 1109-1120, April.
    2. Stadelmann, David & Portmann, Marco & Eichenberger, Reiner, 2013. "Quantifying parliamentary representation of constituents’ preferences with quasi-experimental data," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 170-180.
    3. J. Brian O’Roark, 2012. "Economists in Congress: How Economic Education Motivates Votes on Free Trade in Congress," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 27(Spring 20), pages 83-101.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Legislator voting; Political polarization; Macroeconomic aspect of political economy; D72; E62;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory

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