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War and peace—cyclical phenomena?

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  • Adam Jacobsson

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Abstract

This paper demonstrates how the analysis can differ dramatically between two common modeling approaches to conflict. The first approach uses a one-period setup and associates positive investments in arms with conflict, see, for example, Skaperdas[1992]. The second approach has two periods, where arming decisions are taken in the first period, and the decision on wheter to go to war is taken separately in the second, see, for example, Brito and Intriligator [1985]. The second approach is then used to suggest a new possible explanation for the outbreak of war by showing how myopic players may end up in (Edgeworth) cycles of war and peace.
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Suggested Citation

  • Adam Jacobsson, 2009. "War and peace—cyclical phenomena?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(3), pages 467-480, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:141:y:2009:i:3:p:467-480
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9464-5
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-009-9464-5
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    Cited by:

    1. Antonis Adam & Petros G. Sekeris, 2010. "Self-Containment: Achieving Peace in Anarchic Settings," Working Papers 1014, University of Namur, Department of Economics.
    2. Giacomo De Luca & Petros G. Sekeris, 2013. "Deterrence in Contests," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 80(317), pages 171-189, January.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Appropriative competition; Armed conflict; Cyclical behavior; D74; C72;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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