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Content
September 2006, Volume 128, Issue 3
- 499-500 A Life Reexamined
by Michael Munger - 501-503 To Form a More Perfect Union: A new economic interpretation of the United States Constitution
by Keith Dougherty - 505-509 For the Many or the Few: The Initiative, Public Policy, and American Democracy
by Lars Feld
July 2006, Volume 128, Issue 1
- 1-6 Terrorist Attacks on Western Civilization
by Charles Rowley - 7-39 An analytical history of terrorism, 1945–2000
by William Shughart - 41-75 The Israel and Palestine land settlement problem: An analytical history, 4000 B.C.E.–1948 C.E
by Charles Rowley & Jennis Taylor - 77-90 The Israel and Palestine land settlement problem, 1948–2005: An analytical history
by Charles Rowley & Jennis Taylor - 91-107 Terrorism: The relevance of the rational choice model
by Bryan Caplan - 109-129 Religious extremism: The good, the bad, and the deadly
by Laurence Iannaccone & Eli Berman - 131-146 Preference modification vs. incentive manipulation as tools of terrorist recruitment: The role of culture
by Michael Munger - 147-168 A law and economics perspective on terrorism
by Nuno Garoupa & Jonathan Klick & Francesco Parisi - 169-195 Extremism, suicide terror, and authoritarianism
by Ronald Wintrobe - 197-219 Institutional change in the absence of the rule of law and market mechanisms
by Anne Rathbone Bradley - 221-231 International political system, supreme values and terrorism
by Peter Bernholz - 233-244 Terrorism as theater: Analysis and policy implications
by Tyler Cowen - 245-255 Hiding in plain sight – using signals to detect terrorists
by Atin Basuchoudhary & Laura Razzolini - 257-274 Designing real terrorism futures
by Robin Hanson - 275-287 Terrorism and pork-barrel spending
by R. Coats & Gökhan Karahan & Robert Tollison - 289-315 The political economy of freedom, democracy and transnational terrorism
by Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard & Mogens Justesen & Robert Klemmensen - 317-349 Terrorized economies
by Nicole Crain & W. Crain - 351-356 The several costs of responding to the threat of terrorism
by William Niskanen
June 2006, Volume 127, Issue 3
- 245-250 The normative turn in public choice
by Steven Brams - 251-265 An economic analysis of voting in Sweden
by Henrik Jordahl - 267-284 Political authority, expertise and government bureaucracies
by Miltiadis Makris - 285-303 Voting power and voting blocs
by Dennis Leech & Robert Leech - 305-319 Information is important to Condorcet jurors
by Ruth Ben-Yashar - 321-343 Political geography
by Federico Etro - 345-366 Political competition when media create candidates’ charisma
by Ascensión Andina-Díaz - 367-383 Supreme Court consensus and dissent: Estimating the role of the selection screen
by Brian Goff - 385-405 Market Failures and Government Failures: A Theoretical Model of the Common Agricultural Policy
by Peter Nedergaard - 407-427 The Effects of Regional Sizing on Growth
by Santiago Lago-Peñas & Bruno Ventelou - 429-441 Do supermajority rules limit or enhance majority tyranny? evidence from the US States, 1960–1997
by John Bradbury & Joseph Johnson - 443-459 Government Size and Unemployment: Evidence from Industrial Countries
by Horst Feldmann - 461-483 The impact of closeness on turnout: An empirical relation based on a study of a two-round ballot
by Christine Fauvelle-Aymar & Abel François - 485-489 Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Kenya
by Michael Munger - 491-494 The Encyclopedia of Public Choice
by Edward Tower
April 2006, Volume 127, Issue 1
- 1-3 William C. Mitchell: In memoriam
by Randy Simmons - 5-30 The story of Katrina: New Orleans and the political economy of catastrophe
by Roger Congleton - 31-53 Katrinanomics: The politics and economics of disaster relief
by William Shughart - 55-73 Government's response to Hurricane Katrina: A public choice analysis
by Russell Sobel & Peter Leeson - 75-95 Local government consolidations: The impact of political transaction costs
by Rune Sørensen - 97-121 Presidential Power over Supreme Court Decisions
by Joseph Whitmeyer - 123-132 Activity and inactivity in a rent-seeking contest with private information
by Lambert Schoonbeek & Barbara Winkel - 133-145 Leviathan in the Crosshairs
by Laurie Bates & Rexford Santerre - 147-175 Can the two new aid-growth models be replicated?
by Peter Jensen & Martin Paldam - 177-206 Competition policy for elections: Do campaign contribution limits matter?
by Thomas Stratmann & Francisco J. & Aparicio-Castillo - 207-223 Using state polls to forecast U.S. Presidential election outcomes
by Souren Soumbatiants & Henry Chappell & Eric Johnson - 225-229 Social dynamics
by Adam Gifford - 231-234 Fairness versus welfare
by Paul Rubin - 235-240 The economic effects of constitutions
by Michael Reksulak - 241-243 The Political Economy of Expertise: Information and Efficiency in American National Politics
by James Hamilton
January 2006, Volume 126, Issue 1
- 1-26 Voting by proxy
by Dan Alger - 27-43 Strategy-proof voting for single issues and cabinets
by Stefan Maus & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken - 45-73 Consumer capture of regulatory institutions: The creation of public utility consumer advocates in the United States
by Guy Holburn & Richard Bergh - 75-85 Fiscal consequences of public corruption: Empirical evidence from state bond ratings
by Craig Depken & Courtney Lafountain - 87-106 Corrupt political jurisdictions and voter participation
by Gökhan Karahan & R. Coats & William Shughart - 107-134 The political economics of not paying taxes
by Jesper Roine - 135-144 A contest success function with a tractable noise parameter
by J. Amegashie - 145-176 The effects of party competition on budget outcomes: Empirical evidence from local governments in Spain
by Albert Solé-Ollé - 177-199 State budget stabilization fund adoption: Preparing for the next recession or circumventing fiscal constraints?
by Gary Wagner & Russell Sobel - 201-224 The political economy of mass privatisation and imperfect taxation: Winners and loosers
by Rudiger Ahrend & Carlos Winograd - 225-256 Empirical determinants of corruption: A sensitivity analysis
by Danila Serra
December 2005, Volume 125, Issue 3
- 247-269 Policy making in divided government: A pivotal actors model with party discipline
by Josep Colomer - 271-303 Interest group size dynamics and policymaking
by Vjollca Sadiraj & Jan Tuinstra & Frans Winden - 305-337 Reforms, lobbies and welfare: A common agency approach
by Cecilia Testa - 339-361 Endogenous changes in the exchange rate regime: A bureaucratic incentive model
by Iljoong Kim & Inbae Kim - 363-383 The influence of local and national economic conditions on French legislative elections
by Antoine Auberger & Eric Dubois - 385-407 Legislative district configurations and fiscal policy in American States
by John Bradbury & W. Crain - 409-429 A partisan model of government expenditure
by Thomas Bräuninger - 431-444 The limits of `independence' and the policy of the ECB^
by James Forder - 445-470 Political instability and growth in dictatorships
by Jody Overland & Kenneth Simons & Michael Spagat - 471-475 Gerry Mackie, Democracy defended. Contemporary Political Theory, ed. by Ian Shapiro
by Peter Stone - 477-480 John R. Lott, Jr., The Bias Against Guns: Why Almost Everything You've Heard About Gun Control is Wrong. Washington, DC: Regnery, 2003. 349 pages. USD 27.95 (cloth)
by Dennis Coates - 481-485 Mikhail Filippov, Peter C. Ordeshook and Olga Shvetsova, Designing federalism: A theory of self-sustainable federal institutions
by Michael Alexeev
July 2005, Volume 125, Issue 1
- 1-15 Time inconsistency of monetary policy: Empirical evidence from polls
by Michael Berlemann - 17-41 A critical reappraisal of some voting power paradoxes
by Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano - 43-65 Assessing the citizen – candidate model
by Dan Usher - 67-94 Forming stable coalitions: The process matters
by Steven Brams & Michael Jones & D. Kilgour - 95-127 The effect of membership rules and voting schemes on the success of international climate agreements
by Michael Finus & Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera & Ekko Ierland - 129-149 Salience: Agenda choices by competing candidates
by Marcus Berliant & Hideo Konishi - 151-170 Unanimous constitutional consent and the immigration problem
by Stefan Josten & Klaus Zimmermann - 171-188 Tax morale and (de-)centralization: An experimental study
by Werner Güth & Vittoria Levati & Rupert Sausgruber - 189-202 Rigging elections with violence
by Ashish Chaturvedi - 203-213 Public choice and political philosophy: Reflections on the works of Gordon Spinoza and David Immanuel Buchanan
by Hartmut Kliemt - 215-228 Election campaigns, agenda setting and electoral outcomes
by Manfred Holler & Peter Skott - 229-234 Tariffs, Blockades, and Inflation: The Economics of the Civil War
by William Shughart - 235-238 Appointing central bankers: The politics of monetary policy in the United States and the European Monetary Union. Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
by Mark Toma - 239-242 Economic welfare, international business and global institutional change
by Shawn Humphrey - 243-245 Signaling goodness: Social rules and public choice
by David Laband
September 2005, Volume 124, Issue 3
- 249-266 Non-binding linked-issues referenda: Analysis and an application
by Timo Goeschl - 267-282 “Public goods”: An exercise in calibration
by John Hudson & Philip Jones - 283-308 Health insurance in a democracy: Why is it public and why are premiums income related?
by Mathias Kifmann - 309-328 Symmetric two-stage contests with budget constraints
by William Stein & Amnon Rapoport - 329-352 Political yardstick competition, economic integration, and constitutional choice in a federation:
by Martin Bodenstein & Heinrich Ursprung - 353-364 The tragedy of the political commons: Evidence from U.S. Senate roll call votes on environmental legislation
by Anwar Hussain & David Laband - 365-382 Valence characteristics, costly policy and the median-crossing property: A diagrammatic exposition
by Donald Wittman - 383-390 The dual illusion of grants-in-aid on central and local expenditures: A reply
by Robert Logan & Yeung-Nan Shieh - 391-409 The credibility of monetary reform – New evidence
by Andreas Freytag - 411-422 Rents, dissipation and lost treasures: Rethinking Tullock's paradox
by Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Francesco Parisi - 423-436 Economies of scope and scale in green advocacy
by Anthony Heyes & Catherine Liston-Heyes - 437-451 Self-deception as the root of political failure
by Tyler Cowen - 453-480 Macroeconomic conditions and committee re-election rates
by Joseph McGarrity - 481-484 James T. Bennett, Tax-Funded Politics. New Brunswick, NJ and London: Transaction Publishers, 2004. 204 pages. USD 29.95 (cloth)
by William Shughart - 485-487 Pascal Boyer,Explaining religion: The evolutionary origins of religious thought. New York: Basic Books, 2001
by Kenneth Greene
July 2005, Volume 124, Issue 1
- 1-18 Public choice in the new century
by William Shughart & Robert Tollison - 19-31 Afraid to be free: Dependency as desideratum
by James Buchanan - 33-56 Fragmenting parchment and the winds of war: The Constitution of the United States, 1860–2004
by Charles Rowley - 57-73 Constitutional political economy in the European Union
by Dennis Mueller - 75-93 Collective versus unilateral responses to terrorism
by Todd Sandler - 95-114 Government growth in the twenty-first century
by Randall Holcombe - 115-133 Nineteenth-century voting procedures in a twenty-first century world
by Michael Munger - 135-156 Some talk: Money in politics. A (partial) review of the literature
by Thomas Stratmann - 157-177 The eclipse of legislatures: Direct democracy in the 21st century
by John Matsusaka - 179-204 Corporations, collective action and corporate governance: One size does not fit all
by J. Mulherin - 205-222 The public choice of educational choice
by Lawrence Kenny - 223-236 Public choice and tort reform
by Paul Rubin - 237-247 The unfinished business of public choice
by William Shughart & Robert Tollison
June 2005, Volume 123, Issue 3
- 253-273 Democracy as an equilibrium
by Adam Przeworski - 275-319 What does the European Union do?
by Alberto Alesina & Ignazio Angeloni & Ludger Schuknecht - 321-347 Public sector efficiency: An international comparison
by António Afonso & Ludger Schuknecht & Vito Tanzi - 349-361 The impact of early media election calls on Republican voting rates in Florida’s western Panhandle counties in 2000
by John Lott - 363-392 Why chads? Determinants of voting equipment use in the United States
by Phillip Garner & Enrico Spolaore - 393-410 From Senators to the President: Solve the lumber problem or else
by Daowei Zhang & David Laband - 411-438 Soft money and hard choices: Why political parties might legislate against soft money donations
by David Gill & Christine Lipsmeyer - 439-462 Evidence on the importance of spatial voting models in presidential nominations and elections
by Lawrence Kenny & Babak Lotfinia - 463-476 The robustness of Kingma’s crowd-out estimate: Evidence from new data on contributions to public radio
by Sonia Manzoor & John Straub - 477-493 Pivotal power brokers: Theory and evidence on political fundraising
by Franklin Mixon & Chena Crocker & H. Black
April 2005, Volume 123, Issue 1
- 1-18 Thinking About the Political Impacts of the Electoral College
by Bernard Grofman & Scott Feld - 19-37 In Play: A Commentary on Strategies in the 2004 U.S. Presidential Election
by Jennifer Merolla & Michael Munger & Michael Tofias - 39-47 The Effect of Voting Technology on Voter Turnout: Do Computers Scare the Elderly?
by Gary Roseman & E. Stephenson - 49-58 Problems of Voting
by Gordon Tullock - 59-93 Production and Conflict Models Versus Rent-Seeking Models
by Kjell Hausken - 95-113 The Political Determinants of Federal Expenditure at the State Level
by Gary Hoover & Paul Pecorino - 115-131 Working Well with Others: The Evolution of Teamwork and Ethics
by Daniel Arce M. & L. Gunn - 133-146 Does Political Ideology Affect Economic Growth?
by Christian Bjørnskov - 147-169 Voters AS A Hard Budget Constraint: On the Determination of Intergovernmental Grants
by Lars Feld & Christoph Schaltegger - 171-196 Social Capital and Endogenous Preferences
by Anders Poulsen & Gert Svendsen - 197-216 The Citizen Candidate Model: An Experimental Analysis
by John Cadigan - 217-233 The Impact of Divided Government on Legislative Production
by James Rogers - 235-241 Samuel Kernell (Ed.), James Madison: The theory and practice of Republican government. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003. ix + 381 pages. USD 65.00 (cloth)
by Alan Lockard - 243-248 Mark Thornton and Robert B. Ekelund Jr., Tariffs, Blockades, and Inflation: The Economics of the Civil War. No. 15 in the American Crisis Series: Books on the Civil War Era, Steven E. Woodworth (Ed.), Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 2004. xxix + 124 pages. USD 65.00 (cloth); 19.95 (paper)
by William Shughart - 249-251 W. Mark Crain, Volatile states: Institutions, policy, and the performance of American state economies. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003. xiv +166 pages. USD 49.50/GBP 31.00 (cloth)
by David Schap
March 2005, Volume 122, Issue 3
- 251-276 Lobbying and regulation in a political economy: Evidence from the U.S. cellular industry
by Tomaso Duso - 277-298 The role of intermediaries in corruption
by Güzin Bayar - 299-318 Keeping the other candidate guessing: Electoral competition when preferences are private information
by Adam Meirowitz - 319-331 Anyone for higher speed limits? – Self-interested and adaptive political preferences
by Olof Johansson-Stenman & Peter Martinsson - 333-354 Reputational capital, opportunism, and self-policing in legislatures
by Glenn Parker - 355-393 A logistic growth theory of public expenditures: A study of five countries over 100 years
by Massimo Florio & Sara Colautti - 395-416 Why does centralisation fail to internalise policy externalities?
by Robert Dur & Hein Roelfsema - 417-448 The European constitution project from the perspective of constitutional political economy
by Lars Feld - 449-465 Leviathans, federal transfers, and the cartelization hypothesis
by Marko Köthenbürger - 467-482 Elections with contribution-maximizing candidates
by Amihai Glazer & Mark Gradstein - 483-499 Supreme Court consensus and dissent: Estimating the role of the selection screen
by Brian Goff - 501-512 Charles K. Rowley, William F. Shughart II, and Robert D. Tollison (Eds.), The economics of budget deficits. The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics 153, ed. by Mark Blaug. Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, MA, U.S.A.: Edward Elgar, 2002. 2 vols.; 1, 112 pages. USD 370.00/GBP 245.00 (cloth)
by Daniel Mitchell
January 2005, Volume 122, Issue 1
- 1-8 Editorial Commentary - Gordon Tullock: The man and his scholarship
by Charles Rowley - 9-38 Representative versus direct democracy: The role of informational asymmetries
by Anke Kessler - 39-68 Testing the Mill hypothesis of fiscal illusion
by Rupert Sausgruber & Jean-Robert Tyran - 69-97 Does corruption grease or sand the wheels of growth?
by Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Khalid Sekkat - 99-114 Does free trade really reduce growth? Further testing using the economic freedom index
by Niclas Berggren & Henrik Jordahl - 115-132 Partisan stabilization policy and voter control
by David Kiefer - 133-157 Tax morale in Latin America
by Benno Torgler - 159-175 Can process conditionality enhance aid effectiveness?
by Carsten Hefeker & Katharina Michaelowa - 177-198 Suicide-bombing as inter-generational investment
by Jean-Paul Azam - 199-220 Radicalization as a reaction to failure: An economic model of Islamic extremism
by Mario Ferrero - 221-243 Party competition in a heterogeneous electorate: The role of dominant-issue voters
by Ivo Bischoff - 245-247 L.-A. Gerard-Varet, S.-C. Kolm, and J. Mercier Ythier (Eds.), The economics of reciprocity, giving and altruism. Houndmills and London: Palgrave Macmillan and New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000. x + 387 pages. USD 79.95/GBP 65.50 (cloth)
by Hazem Ghobarah - 248-249 Steven J. Brams, Biblical games: Game theory and the Hebrew Bible. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003. 220 pages. USD 50.00 (cloth); 17.95 (paper)
by Tyler Cowen
December 2004, Volume 121, Issue 3
- 263-277 A Public Choice Analysis of Endangered Species Listings
by R. Rawls & David Laband
February 2004, Volume 121, Issue 3
- 279-308 Collusion, Collective Action and Protection: Theory and Evidence
by Richard Damania & Per Fredriksson & Thomas Osang - 309-333 Tax Britannica: Nineteenth Century Tariffs and British National Income
by Sami Dakhlia & John Nye - 335-361 Inward-Looking Policies, Institutions, Autocrats, and Economic Growth in Latin America: An Empirical Exploration
by Alberto Chong & Luisa Zanforlin - 363-390 The Persistence of Corruption and Regulatory Compliance Failures: Theory and Evidence
by Richard Damania & Per Fredriksson & Muthukumara Mani - 391-412 Exclusive Committee Assignments and Party Pressure in the U.S. House of Representatives
by K. Kanthak - 413-430 Party Polarization and the Business Cycle in the United States
by Edward López & Carlos Ramírez - 431-453 The Advantages of Pure Forms of Parliamentary Democracy over Mixed Forms
by Charles Blankart & Dennis Mueller - 455-480 North-South Climate Change Negotiations: A Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information
by A. Caparrós & J.-C. Péreau & T. Tazdaït - 481-483 Explaining the Enhanced HIPC Initiative: A Response to Michaelowa (2003)
by Peter Hjertholm - 485-486 Why HIPC II Cannot be Explained on the Basis of Economic Theory – A Response to Peter Hjertholm
by Katharina Michaelowa - 487-506 A Neo-Downsian Model of the Alternative Vote as a Mechanism for Mitigating Ethnic Conflict in Plural Societies
by Jon Fraenkel & Bernard Grofman - 507-517 The alternative vote and interethnic moderation: A reply to Fraenkel and Grofman
by Donald Horowitz - 517-520 Geoffrey Brennan and Francis G. Castles (Eds.), Australia Reshaped
by Giuseppe Eusepi
October 2004, Volume 121, Issue 1
- 1-24 Coalition Governments Versus Minority Governments: Bargaining Power, Cohesion and Budgeting Outcomes
by Gerald Pech - 25-49 Monotonicity and its Cognates in the Theory of Choice
by Hannu Nurmi - 51-67 A Model of Political Competition in the Underlying Space of Ideology
by Claudio Bonilla - 69-82 Rewarding Policemen Increases Crime. Another Surprising Result from the Inspection Game
by Luciano Andreozzi - 83-98 Public School Music: Notes on the Public Provision of a Quasi-Private Good
by Laura Langbein - 99-130 A Stiglerian View on Banking Supervision
by Friedrich Heinemann & Martin Schüler - 131-155 Optimal Central Banker Contracts and Common Agency
by Georgios Chortareas & Stephen Miller - 157-177 Competition of Politicians for Incentive Contracts and Elections
by Hans Gersbach - 179-211 Abstention in Daylight: Strategic Calculus of Voting in the European Parliament
by Abdul Noury - 213-238 The Political Economy of Gordon Tullock
by Roger Congleton - 239-255 Social Norms and the Paradox of Elections’ Turnout
by João Amaro de Matos & Pedro Barros - 257-259 Gene Smiley, Rethinking the Great Depression
by Jim Couch - 260-262 George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work
by Bryan Caplan
September 2004, Volume 120, Issue 3_4
- 241-246 A Snipe Hunt
by Robert D. Tollison - 247-266 Political Equilibrium and the Provision of Public Goods
by John C. Goodman & Philip K. Porter - 267-300 The Informal Sector in Developed and Less Developed Countries: A Literature Survey
by Klarita Gërxhani - 301-329 Leviathan and Fiscal Illusion in Local Government Overlapping Jurisdictions
by Rebecca J. Campbell