Anyone for higher speed limits? – Self-interested and adaptive political preferences
Swedish survey-evidence indicates that variables reflecting self-interest are important in explaining people’s preferred speed limits, and that political preferences adapt to technological development. Drivers who believe they drive better than the average driver as well as drivers of cars that are newer (and hence safer), bigger, and with better highspeed characteristics, prefer higher speed limits. In contrast, elderly people prefer lower speed limits. Furthermore, people report that they themselves vote more sociotropically than they believe others vote on average, indicating that we may vote less sociotropically than we believe ourselves. One possible reason for such self-serving biases is that people desire to see themselves as socially responsible. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- David Merrell & Marc Poitras & Daniel Sutter, 1999. "The Effectiveness of Vehicle Safety Inspections: An Analysis Using Panel Data," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 65(3), pages 571-583, January.
- Peterson, Steven & Hoffer, George & Millner, Edward, 1995. "Are Drivers of Air-Bag-Equipped Cars More Aggressive? A Test of the Offsetting Behavior Hypothesis," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(2), pages 251-64, October.
- Brennan, Geoffrey & Hamlin, Alan, 1998.
"Expressive Voting and Electoral Equilibrium,"
Springer, vol. 95(1-2), pages 149-75, April.
- Jianakoplos, Nancy Ammon & Bernasek, Alexandra, 1998. "Are Women More Risk Averse?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 36(4), pages 620-30, October.
- Michael Greenstone, 2002. "A Reexamination of Resource Allocation Responses to the 65-MPH Speed Limit," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 40(2), pages 271-278, April.
- Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, 1997. "Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(1), pages 109-126, Winter.
- Hartog, Joop & Ferrer-i-Carbonell, Ada & Jonker, Nicole, 2002. "Linking Measured Risk Aversion to Individual Characteristics," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(1), pages 3-26.
- Kahneman, Daniel & Knetsch, Jack L., 1992. "Valuing public goods: The purchase of moral satisfaction," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 57-70, January.
- Rienstra, S.A. & Rietveld, P., 1996. "Speed behaviour of car drivers: a statistical analysis of acceptance of changes in speed policies in the Netherlands," Serie Research Memoranda 0007, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics.
- Kjell Arne Brekke & Snorre Kverndokk & Karinen Nyborg, 2000.
"An Economic Model of Moral Motivation,"
290, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
- Copeland, Cassandra & Laband, David N, 2002. "Expressiveness and Voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 110(3-4), pages 351-63, March.
- Akerlof, George A & Dickens, William T, 1982. "The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 307-19, June.
- Gordon Tullock, 2000. "Some Further Thoughts on Voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(1), pages 181-182, July.
- Peltzman, Sam, 1975. "The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 677-725, August.
- Lave, Charles & Elias, Patrick, 1997. "Resource Allocation in Public Policy: The Effects of the 65-MPH Speed Limit," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(3), pages 614-20, July.
- Elster, Jon, 1996. "Rationality and the Emotions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(438), pages 1386-97, September.
- Keser, Claudia & van Winden, Frans, 2000. " Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 102(1), pages 23-39, March.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:122:y:2005:i:3:p:319-331. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.