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Anyone for Higher Speed Limits? - Self-Interested and Adaptive Political Preferences

Author

Listed:
  • Johansson-Stenman, Olof

    (Department of Economics, School of Economics and Commercial Law, Göteborg University)

  • Martinsson, Peter

    (Department of Economics, School of Economics and Commercial Law, Göteborg University)

Abstract

Swedish survey-evidence indicates that variables reflecting self-interest are important in explaining people’s preferred speed limits, and that political preferences adapt to technological development. Drivers of cars that are newer (and hence safer), bigger, and with better high-speed characteristics, prefer higher speed limits, as do those who believe they drive better than average, whereas elderly people prefer lower limits. Furthermore, people report that they themselves vote more sociotropically than they believe others to vote, on average. Self-serving biases are proposed as a bridge between subjectively perceived expressive and sociotropic voting behavior, versus objectively self-interested voting behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Johansson-Stenman, Olof & Martinsson, Peter, 2003. "Anyone for Higher Speed Limits? - Self-Interested and Adaptive Political Preferences," Working Papers in Economics 95, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0095
    Note: Publised in Public Choice, 2005, Vol. 122, pp. 319-331.
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Tyran, Jean-Robert & Sausgruber, Rupert, 2006. "A little fairness may induce a lot of redistribution in democracy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 469-485, February.
    2. Fredrik Carlsson & Olof Johansson‐Stenman, 2010. "Why Do You Vote and Vote as You Do?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(4), pages 495-516, November.
    3. Lars Hultkrantz & Gunnar Lindberg & Camilla Andersson, 2006. "The value of improved road safety," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 151-170, March.
    4. Albalate, Daniel & Bel, Germà, 2012. "Speed limit laws in America: The role of geography, mobility and ideology," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 337-347.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Speed limits; self-interested voting; expressive voting; sociotropic voting; selfserving bias; adaptive political preferences;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

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